A saleswoman is continually badgered by her superior. He tells her that she has a "nice ass" and that he would like to see her naked. He asks her out frequently, despite her continual rejections. He touches her when they talk. At first, he would touch her shoulder or her waist, but today, he runs his hand down her thigh. When she pushes him away, he says: "Loosen up. Are you some kind of prude?"

Is this sexual harassment? Why or why not? Various answers are typically offered to this question. One might claim that it is sexual harassment because it is degrading and makes the woman feel threatened. Alternatively, one could note the negative impact the behavior has on this employeeís work and point out that she is targeted because she is a woman, which is discriminatory. On the other hand, one might respond that such conduct is not sexual harassment but only normal flirtation. One might even argue that the woman could deflect such behavior if she chose to, and if she does not, she probably welcomes it. One could conclude that the behavior does not constitute sexual harassment since the womanís supervisor has not dismissed, demoted, or otherwise penalized her in any "tangible" way. While one could focus on the supervisorís intent, one could alternatively prioritize the womanís perceptions.

Each of these responses reveals different conceptualizations of sexual harassment as a social harm and legal wrong. Using the concept of national cultural repertoires of evaluation, developed in this volume, I will explain why certain types of justifications are more common in the United States than in France and vice versa. I will show how, in the United States, the heavy reliance on market logic and industrial logic (i.e. arguments about professionalism and productivity) (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991), and ("minority") group-based conceptions of inequality shape definitions of sexual harassment. Alternatively, I will demonstrate how French definitions of sexual harassment are shaped by political and legal concepts of individual rights, violence, and abuse of power. Finally, I will discuss how members of one French feminist association, intent on expanding sexual harassment law, draw on American, European, and Canadian cultural and material resources in defining sexual harassment, while those opposing such an expansion do so in part by denouncing perceived American cultural imperialism and insisting on the specificity of French culture.

I use the term "gender" to refer to the social implications of being a man or a woman (see, for example, West and Zimmerman 1987). Expressions like "take it like a man" imply that men should be tough, while a "womanís touch" assumes that women are innately more sensitive. Gender theorists show how such gender varies over time and space and how the politicization of certain issues can challenge ingrained assumptions of gender. The term "marital rape," coined in the 1970s, for instance, dramatically redefined a practice that until then was legitimized by a legal system that only recognized stranger rape. Men were assumed to have unqualified sexual access to their wives. Women were expected to be always sexually available to their husbands. To speak of "marital rape" was to develop a competing theme of female autonomy and sexual desire (see Brownmiller 1975:380-81).

Likewise, formulating sexual harassment as a social harm and legal wrong subverts older concepts of gender and sexuality. It sends a message to men that they can no longer treat women as sexual objects but have to respect their autonomy. It challenges the assumption that men have sexual access to all women who do not explicitly object. Women are told that putting up with their bossesí or colleagueís unwelcome advances is not "part of the job." Considering the stakes involved ñ sexual, political, and economic power ñ it is not surprising that sexual harassment incites such heated political debate. The intense passion and disagreement surrounding sexual harassment forces people to make explicit otherwise taken for granted views regarding not only gender but also politics, work, law, and the public/private divide. For these reasons, differences in how sexual harassment is conceptualized in France and the United States provides a "strategic research site" for exploring the theoretical questions posed in this volume (Merton 1987).

This chapter is part of a larger study of the different ways sexual harassment is conceptualized in France and the United States. The study draws on a wide range of data. To understand legal differences in how sexual harassment has been defined in the two countries, the study examines the major French and American sexual harassment legal texts, including statutes and jurisprudence (see Saguy 1998). To compare media depictions of sexual harassment in the countries, 590 randomly sampled articles from the French and American press were examined, using a complex coding scheme and statistical analysis (Saguy 1999a). The articles span from the mid 1970s, when the term is first coined, until December 31 1998. During the summer of 1997, a series of short telephone interviews with representatives of 23 French branches of large multinational corporations were conducted. Finally, between the summers of 1995 and 1998, over sixty interviews with French and American feminist activists, public figures, lawyers, human resource personnel, and union activists were conducted (see Saguy Forthcoming, 1999b). In this chapter, I focus primarily on legal definitions and on the interviews with the public figures and feminist activists, although I do occasionally refer to the other data to support my arguments.

I conducted the bulk of the interviews with the activists and public figures during the Summer and Fall of 1995. At that time, sexual harassment was a relatively new issue. The term "sexual harassment" or "harcèlement sexuel" only had meaning in some feminist and legal circles from the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, in the United and France, respectively. In 1986, the Supreme Court first ruled that "sexual harassment" was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet, it was not until 1991, following the Hill-Thomas debate, that the American mass media began to report heavily on this topic (Saguy 1999a). While there were only nine articles published in The New York Times, Time and Newsweek in 1989 and only 48 in 1990, there were 198 published in these publications in 1991 and no less than 107 per year thereafter (Saguy 1999a). French Legislative debates over sexual harassment in 1991 and 1992 provoked public debate of this issue that went beyond the feminist associations that had pioneered in this area. At seven articles published in the leading newspaper (Le Monde) and two leading newsmagazines (LíExpress, Le Nouvel Observateur), French media coverage of sexual harassment in France peaked in 1992 and leveled at between one to six per year thereafter.

I regard the respondents as cultural entrepreneurs. Unlike the general population, of which they are not representative, each of the women interviewed has been actively engaged in shaping the public meaning of sexual harassment. The women I call "activists" are involved members of one of two national associationsñ the Association Européenne Contre les Violences Faites aux Femmes au Travail (AVFT ñ European Association Against Violence towards Women at Work), in France, and 9to5: National Association of Working Women (9to5), in the United States. These include but are not limited to: lobbying, raising public awareness through tracts and publications, support for victims through legal advice and emotional support, and research on sexual harassment and other forms of gender discrimination or violence towards women. As these activists try to create and develop conceptualizations of sexual harassment, they are forced to confront cultural and material constraints and draw on social resources. In so doing, they both reveal such constraints and resources and suggest how they can be changed.

In order to cover a wider spectrum of positions, I also interviewed six "public figures," who I expected would understand sexual harassment differently. Each is considered an "expert" by the media on issues of gender and sexuality in general or sexual harassment in particular, yet approaches these issues differently from one another. Like the activists, these "public figures," many of whom are or have also been activists, have been engaged in a public contest over the meaning of sexual harassment. The arguments they deploy are therefore interesting, not because they are representative of the general population, which they are not, but because they are innovative. The three American public figures include theorist, lawyer, and law professor Catharine MacKinnon; social critic and professor of humanities Camille Paglia; and lawyer, syndicated columnist, radio commentator, and national spokesperson for the conservative movement Phyllis Schlafly. The three French public figures include intellectual and activist Marie-Victoire Louis; writer, social critic, and professor of philosophy Elisabeth Badinter; and former Secretary of Womenís Rights and author Françoise Giroud.

Elisabeth Badinter is a well-known intellectual, closely affiliated with the French Socialist Party, who studies male-female social relations in France, and is often interviewed by the mass media on subjects concerning gender (Badinter 1986; 1992). In addition to having served as secretary of womenís rights in 1974-1976 under President Giscard díEstaing (U.D.F.), Françoise Giroud is a nationally renowned writer and editor, has published abundantly on the topic of gender and sexuality, and is often cited in the mass media (Giroud and Lévy 1993). Marie-Victoire Louis is a self-identified radical feminist, scholar and activist who represents a vocal challenge to the French establishment. In 1985, she co-founded the Association Européenne Contre les Violences Faites aux Femmes au Travail (AVFT ñ European Association Against Violence towards Women at Work), which led the campaign for a sexual harassment law, and was serving as president of this association in 1995, when the interview was conducted. In Le Droit de Cuissage (1994), she explored the French history of sexual violence towards women.

Catharine MacKinnon is known worldwide for her pioneering and influential legal writings, especially on sexual harassment ñ the term she is most responsible for promoting ó and pornography. Her 1979 book Sexual Harassment of Working Women, now provides the basis for sexual harassment law in the United States. Camille Paglia and Phyllis Schlafly are among the most vocal critics of this legal interpretation, its political and social implications, and what they perceive to be "American feminism." Camille Paglia has received enormous media attention for her provocative theories of gender and sexuality and her virulent criticism of "mainstream American feminism" (Paglia 1991; 1992). Since the 1970s, Phyllis Schlafly has been a more traditional opponent of "American feminism," arguing that the womenís movement undermines "traditional values" of the family and female domesticity. She is a highly visible spokesperson for the conservative party and the Christian Right.

In addition to these six public figures I interviewed twelve activists ñ six in each country. The sample size is directly constrained by the small number of core French activists ñ all of whom I interviewed ñ at the AVFT during the two years in which I conducted the interviews. The AVFT is based in Paris, though its activists receive calls from and meet with people outside of Paris. Four of the AVFT members interviewed were paid employees and two were volunteering at the time of the interview. I initially interviewed both 9to5 hot-line volunteers in the NY-NJ-CT-PA area, since there were no paid employees in this region, and one former 9to5 volunteer who, at the time of the interview, was providing independent counseling for a fee. I then expanded my sample to include three of the five "most important activists" among paid 9to5 employees in the nation, according to several leaders at the national headquarters.

The interviews were semi-structured, which means that I tried to cover several topics but allowed each interviewee to introduce themes that she considered relevant. The interviews lasted between 35 minutes and three and a half hours, averaging about one hour and a half. I began each interview by asking: "How do you define sexual harassment?" I then asked the respondent if she considered the legal definition appropriate or whether she took issue with it. We explored any reservation the respondent had with national sexual harassment law, including proscribed remedies. In the interviews with the activists, I asked them about their job and the types of cases they encounter. I asked them to discuss their most difficult cases, especially those that seemed to defy the qualification "sexual harassment." This question revealed contradictions in legal and social definitions of sexual harassment.

In interviews with both activists and public figures, I also presented respondents with a series of vignettes, which describe behavior that might be labeled sexual harassment (see Appendix). The vignettes were used to see how the respondents reacted to specific situations, rather than abstract categories. The first paragraph of this article describes one of the vignettes. After reading the story, I asked the respondent the same question I asked of you, the reader, in the introduction: Is this sexual harassment? Why or why not? The vignettes prompted respondents to offer a variety of arguments, like the ones I suggest in my discussion of this vignette in the introduction. In this chapter, I analyze and compare the range of arguments offered by the four groups of respondents in response to these same vignettes to identify cross-national differences and how they play out differently depending on peopleís political orientation.

Feminist research, legal theory, and recorded cases provided the inspiration for my vignettes. By systematically varying the hypothetical peopleís motives, gender, hierarchical position, sexual orientation, relationships with each other, the vignettes reveal the respondentsí criteria of evaluation. For instance, the story above, about the saleswoman who is badgered by her superior, explores if respondents consider the incident "sexual harassment," even though sexual cooperation is not made a requirement of continued employment or advancement. This issue is interesting because of one of the main differences between French and American sexual harassment law. According to French law, sexual harassment involves someone in power, using his position of authority to demand sexual relations from a subordinated. On the other hand, American law has a category called "hostile environment" that refers precisely to situations in which sexual attention, from a boss or colleague, is so severe or pervasive that it negatively alters the employeeís "conditions of work." Through the vignette above, I examine whether the French respondents follow the spirit of their national law by refusing to label the behavior "sexual harassment" since there is no clear threat or coercion involved. Alternatively, I see if they interpret coercion more broadly to include this kind of persistent sexual attention. I examine whether American respondents consider the behavior in this vignette to be "hostile environment" sexual harassment. Alternatively, I see if they take issue with the law or think the behavior is not sufficiently "severe or pervasive" (legal terms) to qualify. In most cases, I am interested in exploring the ways in which the national differences between French and American legal definitions of sexual harassment affect or are similar to differences found in conceptions of sexual harassment between the two national groups of interviewees.

Sexual harassment between hierarchical peers is addressed by American but not French law. To see whether respondents consider hierarchical authority a prerequisite of sexual harassment, I describe a variation of the vignette above, in which the saleswoman is continually pestered, not by her supervisor, but by a fellow salesman.

French law defines sexual harassment as an abuse of hierarchical power. In this theoretical model, the gender of the supervisor and employee is irrelevant. American law, however, defines sexual harassment as gender discrimination. American feminist legal theorists have argued that sexual harassment is the quintessential form of sex discrimination, because when men harass women ñ the overwhelming majority of cases ñ they enact and perpetuate sexism and gender inequality (MacKinnon 1979). Courts have reasoned that sexual harassment of a woman by a man is sex discrimination because the woman is targeted because she was a woman. Had she been a man, they have argued, she would not have been victimized. Using parallel logic, the courts have also declared sex discrimination, sexual harassment of a man by a woman. American sexual harassment jurisprudence is less clear about a person who sexually harasses members of the same sex or members of both sexes. To explore the issue of gender, I included variations, in which a female supervisor harasses a saleswoman, a female supervisor harasses a salesman, a female saleswoman harasses a salesman, a male supervisor pesters a salesman, and a male supervisor torments both men and women under his command.

In the course of each interview, I described eight basic vignettes and several variations of each one. At the phase of data analysis, using full interview transcripts, I systematically compared how each respondent evaluated each vignette and justified her position.

The Paris-Princeton meetings, organized by the editors of this volume shaped the analysis presented here. During these discussions, the French researchers often challenged me to rethink my categories of analysis. This "breaching experiment," as Lamont and Thévenot aptly refer to it in the introduction, sometimes revealed an American bias in my own political and cultural analysis. These confrontations were intellectually and emotionally trying, but they served to hone the analysis in the paper. Marie-Victoire Louis also offered particularly challenging remarks to several drafts of this paper, which forced to me to analyze cultural assumptions that I had taken so much for granted that they seemed irrefutable. Though often painful, this type of intellectual labor is a prerequisite of work that aims to compare different national cultures on their own terms.

In what follows, I draw on the interviews and legal history to discuss some of the major national differences in evaluation that emerge. I focus on themes that are developed elsewhere in this volume: the heavy reliance on market logic and arguments about professionalism, and ("minority") group-based concepts of inequality in the United States and models of political "universalism" in France. In the two sections that follow, I address the American and French case respectively. For each nation, I describe the state of sexual harassment law and analyze some of its main cultural assumptions. I then explore the extent to which respondents reinforce, challenge, or transform these basic assumptions of legal definitions. In the final section, I show how "globalization," or contact with foreign nations and international institutions, can both mitigate and deepen national specificity.

In the previous chapter, Lamont shows how, compared to the French, American anti-racists appeal more to market mechanisms and especially socioeconomic success to refute racism. As a black chemical worker explains, "money makes people equal." Lamont argues that Americans are more likely to regard economic success as providing a key for social acceptance. In contrast, in France, the market is generally not viewed as a legitimate mechanism of distribution of resources and positions. Instead, it is construed as producing inequality, which the state is then expected to remedy through intervention (See Dobbin l993; Esping-Anderson l990).

This national difference informs French and American views of sexual harassment, including those expressed in formal law. Let us first turn to the American case, where arguments about the market, professionalism, and ("minority") group based inequality is crucial in defining why sexual harassment is unacceptable. While Americans have several bodies of law at their disposal for protesting sexual harassment in the workplace, the bulk of jurisprudence is based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This statute makes it illegal employment practice for employers of fifteen or more employees to "fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individualís race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." This statute exists to check discrimination that threatens the ideal nature of the market as open and impartial.

It is not until ten years after the passage of Title VII that lawyers first began using it in cases of sexual harassment. In the first cases, women complained that they were fired or compelled to resign after refusing their bossí sexual advances. The courts initially rejected the argument that such behavior constituted sex discrimination. Instead, by calling it "personal," they argued that it did not fall under the jurisdiction of Title VII.

In taking issue with these rulings, feminist legal theorists and other academics argued that this kind of behavior is anything but personal. Rather, they contended that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination in employment that should be prohibited by law (Farley1978; Ginsberg and Koreski 1977; MacKinnon1979; McGee 1976; Mich. L. Rev. 1978; Minn. L. Rev. 1979; NYU Law Review 1976; Seymour 1979; Taub 1976; Vermeulen 1981). For instance, in her 1979 book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, Catharine MacKinnon (1979:7) argued that sexual harassment is sex-discrimination because it disadvantages women in employment, especially through occupational segregation. According to her analysis, sexual harassment at work uses womenís employment positions to coerce them sexually, while using their sexual position to coerce them economically. MacKinnon thus drew on and altered what was, at the time, a relatively new legal and cultural category of sex discrimination, but which has become a particularly salient element of an American cultural "toolkit" (Swidler 1986).

Largely in response to such legal research, in the late 1970s, courts progressively began ruling that sexual harassment was a violation of Title VII. In 1980, relying on work by feminists like MacKinnon and Nadine Taub, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ñ the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title VII ñ drafted sexual harassment guidelines for the courts (Oppenheimer 1995:115). These guidelines defined sexual harassment as:

1. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of the individualís employment.
2. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual.
3. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individualís work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment (C.F.R. 1604.11(a)).

The Supreme Court embraced these guidelines in its first sexual harassment ruling, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. In this decision, the court institutionalized in law the two-prong definition created by MacKinnon (1979) and affirmed by the EEOC. In "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, a boss uses official authority to coerce an employee into having sexual relations. In "hostile environment" sexual harassment, no clear ultimatum is offered. Rather, sexual innuendo ñ by a boss or a peer ñ is so "severe or pervasive" that it "unreasonably interferes with an individualís work performance. In both cases, employers can be sued under Title VII for sexual harassment occurring at their place of work.

By making Title VII the privileged legal avenue for addressing sexual harassment, feminist scholars, lawyers, and judges emphasized: 1) the employment consequences of sexual harassment and 2) gender inequality. MacKinnon argued that "work is critical to womenís survival and independence" and that the government has greater obligation to protect womenís rights at work than elsewhere: "Legally, women are not arguably entitled, for example to a marriage free of sexual harassment any more than to one free of rape, nor are women legally guaranteed the freedom to walk down the street or into a court of law without sexual innuendo. In employment, the government promises more." (MacKinnon 1979:7, emphasis added). The public status of sexual harassment was thus established by squarely positioning it within the workplace.

Advocates of Title VII sexual harassment law further disputed the idea that sexual harassment is "personal" by showing how it is "based on sex." For instance, MacKinnon (1979:173) argued that sexual harassment is not "merely a parade of interconnected consequences with the potential for discrete repetition by other individuals." Rather, it is a group-defined injury, suffered by individuals (usually women) because of their sex. She favored the use of Title VII for addressing sexual harassment (rather than tort law which applies to harm between individuals) because it clearly conveys the group injury aspect of sexual harassment. The focus on group-based employment discrimination is also institutionalized in the structure of the association 9to5. According to an undated letter by 9to5 to its members, "the workplace issues most often raised by hot-line callers include" (in order): Family and Medical Leave law, sexual harassment, gender discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, work and family, computer health and safety, racial discrimination, and pay equity.

I am not arguing that American legal traditions ñ even Title VII ñ uniformly or entirely promote a model of group rights. On the contrary, as any first-year law student knows, the dominant legal tradition in the United States is liberal individualism. However, by recognizing that individuals are persecuted or discriminated against because they belong to particular groups, which are officially recognized by institutions like the census, the law does ñ if inadvertently and impartially ñ acknowledge group rights (see See Ehrenreich 1990; Minow 1990, 1997; Scott 1996). Moreover, the United States has institutionalized traditions of categorizing people by group ñ especially "race" and ethnic ñ affiliation. For centuries, African-Americans were denied basic human and civil rights because of their "race." Today, affirmative action programs use the category of "race" to redistribute power and resources. In "identity politics" racial, gender, religious, and other identities provide a basis for political mobilization (See Appiah 1994; Austin 1992; Steinberg 1981). Time and again, the Americanís womenís movement has drawn on arguments about racism to develop claims about sexism (see Evans 1989).

The following excerpt, from an interview with an American activist, reveals a common emphasis on both the labor market and on group-based discrimination in the United States. In the course of the interview, I read the first vignette, in which "an employer asks a female job applicant during their interview to spend the weekend with him in San Francisco. He tells her that he will make up his mind about the job after the weekend." I further clarified that the employer is "thinking of a romantic weekend in which theyíd be sharing a hotel room." This respondent explains why she considers this to be sexual harassment: though not yet an employee, she is "being looked at as an employeeÖ. Iíd say because sheís coming on a job interview to be an employee, at that point, sheís covered. And if he wants it to be an intimate rendezvous, and basically says that, then that would be harassment to me." When I ask why, the respondent replies: "Because thatís [made] a condition of her employment." When probed about why it is wrong to make sex a condition of someoneís employment, the activist laughs and says: "Well I thought that was one of our basic rights, freedom from gender discrimination."

While the American activists rely heavily on market rationale and arguments about group-based discrimination, they also discuss competing themes of non-material losses and personal dignity. For instance, in response to a variation of the vignette described in the introduction, in which a saleswoman is pestered by a colleague, one New Jersey activist says: "Her whole career is threatened. She canít work in that environment. Itís a hostile environment. I donít care whoís doing it to her. If itís the janitorÖ Itís a hostile environment. The impact will be the same. Sheíll go home and sheíll be the same way with her husband, her children, sheíll not feel good about herself. You canít work like that." This respondent thus stresses both the threat this behavior poses for the womanís continued employment and the strain it creates in her personal and family life.

Many of the American activists use arguments about professionalism and productivity to condemn sexual innuendo in the workplace that falls short of sexual harassment. For instance, when probed about the risk that over-zealous employers might stamp out playful, harmless, fun flirtation in the workplace, one respondent explains: "Why do people have toÖ? Really they donít have to have everyday seduction and flirtation in the workplaceÖ. Has it been proven that that helps productivity?" Likewise, Catharine MacKinnon says in her interview: "Somebody ought to get worried about the fact that no work is getting done. And the work place is not a place for sexual recruitment exclusively. Now people are supposed to be getting things done." These arguments echo those made by Human Resource departments across the United States that refer to the "bottom line" to ban a range of behavior, like consensual dating or sexist jokes, that fall short of sexual harassment, as legally defined (Saguy 1999b; (Weiss 1998).

Of course, American feminists are not concerned about sexual harassment only because of its effects on industrial productivity. In a discussion with Catharine MacKinnon about the way I use the above citation in an earlier draft of this chapter, she points out that even if it were proven that sexual harassment improves productivity, she would still oppose it. Indeed, a common goal among people who call themselves feminists is gender equality not industrial efficiency. Such use of market logic is by many American respondents is evidence that arguments about professionalism and productivity are particularly effective in legitimizing particular positions in the American context.

The American respondents use analyses based on market logic, industrial logic or group-based discrimination strategically to strengthen their positions. However, they are not constrained by these arguments. Rather, in the interviews, they often disregard them when they do not provide a resource for condemning a given behavior. For instance, in one variation of the first vignette, I present the following scenario: "A boss is interviewing several men and women for positions as sales representative. He lets each of them know that if they want the job, they will have to have sexual relations with him." Because the boss harasses both men and women, it is difficult to claim that his behavior is discriminatory, a necessary condition under Title VII.

Notwithstanding, all of the American respondents label this conduct sexual harassment. As one respondent says: "It doesnít matter if heíll sleep with anyone. To insist on that as an aspect of your employment is sexual harassment." Another concurs: "Itís sexual harassment for all of them." According to another: "As far as I understand, itís still the unwanted, offensive, usually repeated behavior of a sexual nature." In other words, while respondents are quick to use anti-discrimination arguments when useful, they disregard the discrimination component of sexual harassment when it would limit protection of employees. All of the respondents believe that this vignette illustrates a case of sexual harassment, which suggests that, even in the United States sexual harassment is only partly conceptualized as a form of gender discrimination. In the interviews, respondents draw on more popular concepts of right and wrong, coercion, abuse, and power seem to go beyond the definition of sexual harassment as discrimination.

In other instances, respondents use the logic of discrimination and the market to extend legal definitions. The most striking example of this is the frequent condemnation of discrimination against homosexuals. In one of the vignettes, I describe a woman who taunts a young gay man about his sexual preference. Five of the six American activists say that this type of behavior should be considered sexual harassment. The sixth prefers to label it "discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." All extend the status of protected group to homosexuals, even though sexual orientation is not protected under Title VII or any other Federal discrimination law. As one activist explains: "That is sexual harassment. She's discriminating against him. She's calling him a fag. She's saying that he's like one of the girls. She's calling him derogatory names because of his sexual orientation."

Similarly, opponents of strong sexual harassment law also appeal to market principles, but in the name of a free market and individualism. As Schlafly says: "I just donít think we should have a government inspector at every water cooler to catch some man whoís a slob." She draws on fiscally conservative politics that commend laissez-faire market models, suggesting that a free labor market is capable of dealing with sexual harassment because people who are mistreated can "get another job." In response to my query about those who might have trouble finding another job, she says that "no-one has a right to a job." Such arguments are produced by the (fiscally) conservative movement in the United States, which has no equivalent in France, where the market is expected to be more restricted by social considerations (see Toinet, Kempf, and Lacorne 1989). Such reasoning draws on another popular conception of the public/private divide in the United States, in which the labor market is considered "private" and therefore beyond the scope of state intervention. For years, however, the American government has regulated the labor market out of concern for both employees and employers. In France, of course, state intervention in the market enjoys even greater public support.

Paglia echoes Schlaflyís arguments about free market economics and ownerís prerogatives, affirming that she "believes in private property." She likens small businesses to fiefdoms and says that a small owner should be free to hire whom he chose and even to have a "harem of women that he wants to sleep with." She qualifies this statement, however, by saying that middle managers are accountable to public interests and should not "sexualize their job." To do so would be "unprofessional." Paglia explains that while a family firm is "private" and should be free from government intervention, large firms "have evolved economically into public institutions," so that outside intervention is appropriate there. Shocking as Pagliaís statement about business fiefdoms may appear, her personal demarcation of the public and private, in which smaller enterprises ("the mom and pop companies") are "private" but larger ones are public, echo American political traditions. For instance, as is reviewed above, Title VII, the federal statute on which sexual harassment jurisprudence is founded, only applies to businesses with more than fifteen employees. Smaller business are less accountable to federal control.

American activists do not talk about the rights of small business owners in such terms. However, they do develop the idea that one should be "professional" at work. This means being productive and maintaining social distance with coworkers. As one American activists says: "As a professional, I think about going to work and getting my work done and having a relationship with a colleague as a professional relationship. But to even go over that line into a real personal relationship, I think that can be dangerous and not wise."

The French respondents do not talk about the importance of productivity or professional relations. As we shall see, the French speak less about group-based discrimination than individual harm and abuse of power.

French sexual harassment law emerges from a different legal and social context than American sexual harassment law. During a far-reaching reform of the French Penal Code, in 1990-1991, French lawmakers added a specific sexual harassment statute to Book II of the new Penal Code, which addresses crimes and misdemeanors (délits) against people (as opposed to property). Within Book II of the new Penal Code, the sexual harassment statute is included under Title II, entitled "Affronts to Persons" (Des atteintes à la personne humaine) (Serusclat 1992:6; for a legislative history of this bill see Cromer 1992; Cromer and Louis 1992).

The law that was ultimately approved defines sexual harassment as "the act of harassing another by using orders, threats, or constraint, in the goal of obtaining sexual favors, by someone abusing the authority conferred by his position." In other words, this statute only recognizes that which American jurisprudence calls "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, or situations of sexual coercion, when employers, bosses, clients, or other people with power abuse their "official authority" to try to force employees to grant them or a third party "sexual favors." Moreover, rather than focus on the victimís perception of the behavior as "unwelcome," French law defines sexual harassment from the perspective of the perpetrator, who acts to receive "sexual favors." However, unlike American law, French law also protects potential whistle-blowers.

In France, there is a long tradition of critiquing the arbitrary use of power. Thirty-five years ago, sociologist Michel Crozier argued that many French often conceive authority to be universal, absolute, and unrestrained (Crozier 1964:220). In her more recent book, Lamont (1992:49) finds that this general attitude persists. French workers are more likely than their American counterparts to believe that managers exercise power for their own benefit, while American workers are more likely to say that they use such power for the collective good or for the good of the company. French activists, intellectuals, and journalists have anchored their critique of "sexual harassment" in another term that clearly evokes abuse of power: le droit de cuissage. This is the title of Marie-Victoire Louisís (1994) book, mentioned above. Moreover, over one third of my sample of articles on sexual harassment published in the Nouvel Obs (N=24) explicitly refer to le droit de cuissage. This term, also known as le droit de seigneur or the First Night, refers to a feudal tradition, in which the Lord had a right to sleep with his serfsí bride on their wedding night. , ,, In the 19^th century, the term "droit de cuissage" was used to refer to overseers who, because of the enormous power they had over female factory workers, engaged in (often consensual and frequently coerced) sexual relations with them, a practice that was condemned by several strikes and demonstrations (Louis 1994). This term was "reinvented" in the late 1980s to raise consciousness about what was then beginning to be called "sexual harassment."

French criminal law categorizes sexual harassment as sexual violence, ranking it fourth in severity, after rape, sexual assault, and exhibitionism. "Sexual harassment" refers specifically to the psychological coercion that people in positions of authority can exert to obtain sexual relations from people under their control. It is differentiated from sexual assault and rape, in which physical force or touching is involved, although one can bring several of these charges at once. French law thus groups sexual harassment with other forms of sexual coercion or violence, rather than with other forms of employment discrimination. Obviously, in the United States, people who are physically abused at work or elsewhere can also appeal to criminal laws against sexual assault and rape although they then face stricter standards of evidence and cannot collect monetary compensation. Under Title VII, however, assault and rape are very egregious forms of sexual harassment, condemned because they constitute employment discrimination.

As political scientist Erik Bleich (1998) shows in his study of anti-racist policy in France and England, France has primarily addressed discrimination in general in the penal rather than civil code. Moreover, if we consider inflammatory statements to be a form of verbal violence, we would conclude that the French focus on violence is not limited to sexual harassment law. For, as Bleich also demonstrates, French politicians and activists have concentrated their energies on "expressive racism," or inflammatory statements or written expressions made against individuals or groups because of their ethnicity rather than, like their English counterparts, "access racism," or discrimination in employment, housing and goods and services,

The violence paradigm is not unique to French law. The focus on violence is also institutionalized in the European Association against Violence towards Women at Work (AVFT), which is founded in 1985 to combat "violence towards women at work," including sexual harassment. According to an article presenting the AVFT (Cromer 1990) in an anthology edited by the AVFT (1990):

Note that this small passage mentions both discrimination and the employment consequences of this "violence at work." Yet, it does not subsume all forms of sexual violence ñ including rape and assault ñ under the term "sexual harassment," nor in turn subsume sexual harassment under the term "gender discrimination." Rather, the AVFT establishes violence as the primary category and lists sexual harassment and discrimination as forms of violence against women. This declaration, published before the French sexual harassment laws were passed, is therefore quite consistent with French law in its categorization of sexual harassment. Yet, it uses the term "violence" to target a wider range of behavior, including discrimination, sexist and sexually offensive language, and pornography.

Similarly, the French activists are more likely to discuss sexual harassment as an act of violence than as an impediment to equal opportunity in employment. Yet, they use the concept of violence more broadly than does French law. One French activist explains why she thinks sexual harassment among colleagues is wrong by saying: "For me, thatís an act of violence. To be constantly behind someone harassing them, thatís a kind of violence." Another says that she considers pornography an "agression sexuelle" or sexual assault.

Moreover, like their American counterparts, the French activists often mix several rationales in their arguments about sexual harassment. In the following citation, a French activist explains why sexual harassment is wrong: "Sexual harassment is a denial of [womenís] right to work, but what [harassers] try to do more profoundly is to dominate [women] by denying their word. In fact, we find that women often say no, maybe implicitly initially and then very explicitly, but the [harassers] do not hear the ëno.í Refusing to hear what another says is like saying: ëyou donít exist.í So itís really destruction. ëYou donít exist and I destroy your intimacy, your personality, the psychological and physical barriers that you have constructed.í I think that, for many women, this has a certain resonance in a patriarchal society that continually tries to oppress them with violence." This woman skillfully weaves arguments about employment opportunity, psychological harm, violence, and systematic oppression of women into a few sentences.

After passage of the penal code law, in 1992, a complimentary statute in the labor law was passed with the support of the secretary of womenís rights, Véronique Neiertz. This statute (Art. L. 122-46), which allows employees who have been fired or demoted to demand back pay and unemployment benefits, states:

Addressing specifically the employment consequences of sexual harassment, this statute is close in spirit to American sexual harassment law. However, even this statute differs from Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence in an important way: it is not framed as a form of discrimination. Like the criminal statute, there is no reference to discrimination in article L. 122-46 of the Labor Law.

That the discrimination component of sexual harassment was largely abandoned during legislative debates is not surprising given the context of discrimination law in France. Unlike the United States or Great Britain, where discrimination is addressed in civil law, French employment discrimination laws are inscribed in penal law. On one hand, using criminal law ñ which carries the possibility of prison sentences ñ to punish discrimination sends an important message about the seriousness of this problem. On the other, French discrimination law is rarely invoked in court according to the AVFT activists and the ten French lawyers I have interviewed (see also Bleich 1998; Banton 1994). In 1991, for example, British civil procedures led to 1,471 cases of employment related racial discrimination. 1991 employment related convictions for racial discrimination in France, by contrast, totaled four (Banton 1994: 485, cited in Bleich 1998:8). This stems largely from higher standards of proof demanded under French discrimination law. Unlike American and British law, where one can protest against "indirect discrimination"ó for instance, using statistics to demonstrate discriminatory impact on a group ñ under French law, one must demonstrate discriminatory intent. Without a legal tradition of indirect discrimination and differential impact, French social actors have little cognitive and legal basis in which to ground claims about discriminatory environments.

There is also less of a political and cultural basis in France for categorizing people according to racial, ethnic, or religious affiliation. By separating the church and state, the Third Republic hoped to confine customs and beliefs to the "private sphere," meaning both that the state should not segregate citizens according to these criteria and that citizens should not "politicize" these differences (Noiriel 1992: 109). Consequently, and in accordance with republican principles, Franceís census does not gather information about race, ethnicity, or religion, which subsequently makes it difficult to measure racial discrimination. Of course, the state practice (or lack thereof) is self-reinforcing. Without an objective measure of racial inequality, it is difficult to make this a political rallying point. While racial categorization in the United States can serve to reify "races" and reinforce racism, the lack of a statistics in France on racial disparity can obscure discrimination and racism. In the United States, the politicization and theorization of racism has provided a basis for denouncing other forms of group-based discrimination. In France, opponents of the politicization of group identity can and do appeal to long political traditions of an assimilating model of nationhood (Brubaker 1992, Scott 1997).

As was mentioned, French law defines discrimination purely in terms of employment decisions, unlike American law, which condemns behavior that creates a discriminatory environment, especially when sexual innuendo is also involved. French law does not, for instance, categorize as illegal discrimination the behavior of a boss, in the vignette described above, who insults his female, and only his female, employees, calling them incompetent and slow. Yet, half of the AVFT members call this behavior "discrimination," while the other half call it "sexist." Those that label it "discrimination" admit that it would be difficult to maintain such a position before the law but think that it should nonetheless be pursued legally. Those who call it "sexist" adopt a gender inequality analysis but do not consider it compatible with French law.

Elisabeth Badinter and Françoise Giroud, on the other hand, resist categorizing this type of gender-based hostility. They each condemn quid pro quo sexual harassment because it involves coercion of individuals by people in position of authority. While they recognize that women are more often harassed than men, they do not understand the harassment as customarily legitimized by sexism or as a form of employment discrimination. Rather, they stress the abuse of hierarchical power involved. For instance, when I ask Françoise Giroud how she defines sexual harassment, she says: "Itís generally an attitude of supervisors [petits chefs] in offices, in factories, who think they can do anything because the employees are without defenseÖ There are even [laughter] cases of sexual harassment of men by women. There was one last year, I donít know if you saw that, who was absolutely persecuted by a woman. Still, thatís very rare." While emphasizing the formal power of the boss and institutional vulnerability of the employee, Giroud does not analyze the power men have over women by virtue of being men. Giroud does not discuss situations in which, for example, female managers and professionals are sexually harassed by colleagues who perceive them as a threat and use sexuality to "put them in their place."

For Françoise Giroud and Elisabeth Badinter, sexual harassment is necessarily sexual. They resist seeing sexual harassment as an instance of gender discrimination. In response to a vignette describing a boss who insults his female but not male employees, calling them "incompetent and slow," Françoise Giroud says: "Thatís just someone with a bad character. You canít condemn him for sexual harassment." When I then ask if this person could be condemned for anything, Giroud replies: "I donít think so. Thatís the case of lots of supervisors [petits chefs]. The hierarchy needs to be changed. Thatís something else!" I try to make the insults more specifically discriminatory (e.g. "dumb broad!"). Giroud repeats that it is not sexual harassment and finally says that it could be considered an insult and that he could be "condemned for insults." I point out that there is a French law against racist insults and ask if there should not also be a law against sexist insults. Giroud replies: "I donít believe there is a need to be specific. It should be recognized simply as an insultÖ because itís an insult regardless of whether or not it is sexist. An insult should be condemned." After much prodding, Giroud agrees that the behavior should be tempered, but refuses to group it with either sexual harassment or gender discriminatory.

Similarly, Elisabeth Badinter resists the idea that certain supervisors are verbally abusive to female employees because of their gender, making this vignette particularly frustrating for her: "Listen, this is one of the most unbelievable cases [cas de figure] because why would he hire her then? Knowing that sheís a girl and he canít stand women? I donít know. I canít answer." Badinter thus takes issue with a point that French and American gender scholars have been making. Based on empirical studies, several scholars have argued that many women workers are targeted for abusive behavior precisely because their colleagues and/or supervisors resent working with women (e.g. AVFT 1990; Cockburn 1991; Cromer 1995; Epstein 1992; Kanter 1977; Schultz 1998; Williams 1995).

In the previous two sections, I discussed the United States and France independently of one another. The reality of sexual harassment law and social conceptions, however, is not so neatly divided along national boundaries. In this section, I examine how AVFT activists draw on cultural and material resources from outside of France to promote their definition of sexual harassment. I also point to the "boundary work" (Lamont 1992) produced by lawmakers and public figures ñ including Françoise Giroud and Elisabeth Badinter ñagainst foreign nations to oppose the position advocated by the AVFT.

AVFT members often speak about their ties to feminist intellectuals and activists across the globe, with whom they share written texts, oral presentations, and personal ties. Through national, international, or foreign conferences and workshops, organized by the United Nations, universities, or various associations, AVFT activists frequently participate in international feminist dialogues that shape their perspectives. This is suggested by the following quotes, where activists describe ideas which they explicitly attribute to such international influences: "[the primacy of the womanís viewpoint] is a position defended by American feminists." "As the Canadian women say, ëFor guys, itís clear. [Ö] A woman is there to be pretty, made up, in a short skirt, even fondled.í [Ö] Itís because sheís a woman that she is treated like that. So if thatís not discrimination, I donít know what is!"

One of the activists, who is trained as a jurist, is particularly skillful in drawing on American, Canadian, and European legal concepts and French legal categories. For instance, in response to the vignette described in the introduction, she says: "If we took out the physical touching and only kept the language, one could consider that this creates a sexist environment. Itís the type of environmental harassment that would not at this moment be pursued by the law narrowly conceived [in France]. But, in my opinion, that could change because, you have to be logical. Ö I donít see what [the victim] can think besides: ëif I donít smile, if I donít laugh when he says these stupid things, I could be fired at the next downsizing.í One must be realistic. In my opinion, there is constraint. And Ö if she says yes, he wonít say no. So, implicitly his remarks aim at obtaining sexual favors." This respondentís use of the term "environmental harassment" resembles the utilization of the category "hostile environment" sexual harassment in American law. However, because French law does not recognize hostile environment sexual harassment, this respondent expands explicit components of French law ñ "constraint" and "sexual favors" ñ so they can accommodate the behavior in the vignette. Largely due to the influence the AVFT has had on the courts via their influence on plaintiff lawyers, jurisprudence has evolved in this direction (Minet and Saramito1997).

Marie-Victoire Louis explains that before beginning her book on the history of the droit de seigneur in France, she read American and Canadian work that "saved [her] years of reflection." Other AVFT members also mention having read research in womenís studies by American, Canadian, and English authors. The first AVFT conference on sexual harassment and the anthology that grew out of it includes work by a range of French and international scholars, including, for instance, Catharine MacKinnon (AVFT 1990). Since its inception, the AVFT has collaborated with many American activists, students, and scholars. Members of the AVFT strategically use recommendations, studies, and theory generated by international bodies like the European Union, and foreign nations like the U.S. and Canada to gain leverage in national debates over sexual harassment. As Marie-Victoire Louis explains: "We leaned sociologically and intellectually on the United States and on Europe. [Ö] The [European] Councilís decisions and recommendations allowed us to push the [French] legislation. It was an extraordinary tool. [Ö] [Our use of it] was strategic. The association got its first concrete financial support from [the European Community]. [Ö] So Europe allowed us to live financially and we could draw on those different declarations [Ö] and sexual harassment surveys [to argue our case]."

The Council of the European Community issued its first directive on sex equality at work in 1976 (76/207/CEE.). In 1987, the EC published the Rubinstein report on sexual harassment (Rubinstein 1987). By framing sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, the EC justifies intervening under the equality clause in the Treaty of Rome. In 1991, the European Union issued a specific, non-binding recommendation concerning sexual harassment that states:

1. this behavior is inappropriate [intempestif], abusive, and hurtful for the person who is its object;
2. the fact that a person refuses or accepts such behavior from an employer or a worker (including a hierarchical superior or a colleague) is used explicitly or implicitly as the basis for a decision affecting the rights of that person in matters of professional training, employment, maintaining employment, promotion, salary or any other decision relative to employment and/or
3. such behavior creates a climate of intimidation, hostility or humiliation for the person who is its object

The similarities between these recommendations and the EEOC guidelines are striking. Note in particular, that they both stress the victimís perspective by describing the behavior as "unwelcome," in the American case, and as "inappropriate, abusive, and hurtful," in the European case. The two texts recognize both behavior that has tangible employment repercussions and that which simply creates a hostile or intimidating environment. Both acknowledge that employees can be harassed by their colleagues as well as by their hierarchical superiors. Like the United States, the European Community justifies the recommendation on sexual harassment by stressing the link to sex discrimination. However, the EC recommendations also justify the intervention as a protection of "dignity," a theme not present in the American legal debates.

The AVFT used the European recommendations to argue for the necessity of a sexual harassment law in France. In June 1990, the AVFT drew on the European recommendations, among other resources, to draft a proposal for the penal code, which defined sexual harassment as:

Note that this bill defines sexual harassment more broadly than American law. Like American law, it includes a range of sexual innuendo and gender harassment. It goes beyond American law by condemning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. While stressing peopleís rights to employment opportunity, it also stresses their rights to dignity, moral and physical integrity, and services.

As we know, the law that was eventually passed is more narrow than the AVFT guidelines. The AVFT promptly pointed out what they perceived to be shortcomings in the bill, namely its limited provisions for employer liability and its refusal to recognize either peer harassment or hostile environment sexual harassment. In an article, three members of the AVFT write:

They point to several negative effects of hostile environment sexual harassment, including in employment and health. These authors further point out that this definition contradicts the European Community Recommendation (nƒ 92/131/CEE). Yet, as we will see, while the AVFT urges that France look to Europe, the United States, and Canada for legal and cultural models; other more influential social actors argue that such foreign influence should be resisted.

Recently, there has been both much speculation and important social scientific research about the effects of "globalization," or the perceived increasingly international nature of, for instance, economic markets, politics, and/or culture (see Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer 1994; Meyer et al. 1991; Strang and Meyer 1994). Boli and Thomas, for instance, identify the principles of universalism, individualism, voluntaristic authority, rational progress, and world citizenship as central elements of world culture. According to these authors, work on international change in the status and role of women, shows that world cultural models now make state action on behalf of women virtually obligatory, as states learn that they have an interest in placating transnational and domestic womenís groups committed to equality (Berkovitch 1994; cited in Boli and Thomas 1997:186). This work is insufficient in at least two intimately connected respects. First, because it examines "globalization" at an extremely macro level, it does not adequately theorize the ways in which local womenís groups use international law, institutions, and rhetoric in concrete struggles. Second, this body of literature does not explore the multiple ways in which other local social actors oppose "international models" on the grounds that they do not account for the "specificity" of "national culture." Both of these tendencies have had an important role in French debates over sexual harassment.

For example, based on a content analysis of press articles (N=133) in the leading French newspaper and news magazines, half of the French articles about sexual harassment focus on sexual harassment in the United States rather than in France (Saguy 1999a). The French press thus portrays sexual harassment as an American issue, of little concern at home. French articles about the United States are significantly more likely than French reporting about France to present sexual harassment as a moral issue, to suggest that women routinely use their sexuality to "sleep up" the corporate ladder, or to present sexual harassment plaintiffs as gold-diggers. When reporting on the United States, the French press is also more likely to portray sexual harassment regulation as an invasion of privacy. By documenting such "American excesses," these articles serve as a warning to French readers that sexual harassment law should be approached with caution. They transfer concern about the harm of sexual harassment to anxiety over sexual harassment law and they make a domestic problem a question of national identity.

Such concern shaped debates in the National Assembly. Opponents of the first sexual harassment bills argued that sexual harassment bills à líaméricaine would disrupt gender relationships and threaten everyday seduction (The Official report of the Senate, nƒ 350, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1991-1992, p.32). Eventually, Yvette Roudy and Véronique Neiertz, the lawmakers who proposed the criminal and labor sexual harassment laws, respectively, played off such fears. They each presented revised bills that defined sexual harassment narrowly ñ as abuse of official authority to obtain sexual relations ñ and argued that these modest proposals would respect the "specificity of French culture." In legislative debates, these bills were portrayed as modest, "avoid[ing] the excesses of North American legislation" that lead "to the repression of libertine discussion [propos grivois], gauloiseries [literally meaning typical of the French, also called the Gaulles, but referring to lewd discussion], or simple light jokes or comments having to do with sexual relations" (Assemblée Nationale 1992:28). Yvette Roudy explained why she compromised in order to pass the bill at all:

In other words, Roudy strategically emphasized the most taken-for-granted ideas about inequality in France ñ hierarchical power ñ rather than developing new, more controversial themes of sexism and discrimination. Likewise, when presenting her proposal of a sexual harassment labor law, Véronique Neiertz disarmed her adversaries by contrasting the "reasonable" character of the French initiative to American "excesses" and by limiting the content of the project to address only sexual harassment of an employee by her or his boss (Jenson and Sineau 1995:287).

Such public representations were used by most of the French activists, public figures, lawyers, human resource personnel and union activists I interviewed. Respondents often ask me if the rumors in France about American workplaces and universities are true. "Is it true," they typically ask, "that men wonít enter an elevator alone with a woman out of fear that she would then accuse him of sexual harassment?" "Is it true that professors always leave their door open to protect themselves from accusations of sexual harassment?"

Indeed, the two public figures that have been most vocal skeptics of sexual harassment law are neither right wing nor opponents of womenís rights. On the contrary, Françoise Giroud is politically center and a former Secretary of Womenís Rights. Elisabeth Badinter is a prominent intellectual, a self-identified and press-identified "feminist," and closely affiliated with the French Socialist Party. This can partly be explained by media practices that aim to maximize the element of surprise in reporting; it is particularly "newsworthy" when a prominent feminist criticizes a feminist law. However, the disagreement over sexual harassment between women like Elisabeth Badinter and Françoise Giroud, on one hand, and Marie-Victoire Louis, on the other, is symptomatic of a more general division among people in who call themselves "feminists" about "Republicanism." For instance, Louis was among the prominent feminists who recently championed a constitutional amendment that would impose gender parity in the National Assembly, while other feminists, like Badinter, opposed it on the grounds that it violated "republican principles of universality" (see Projets Féministes 1996; Scott 1997).

In France, Françoise Giroud and Elisabeth Badinter praise the French sexual harassment law for its exclusive focus on abuse of power and criticize the broader reach of American regulation. In defending the French law, Giroud and Badinter draw symbolic boundaries against Americans and, more specifically, against American feminists. They present American society as seized by gender warfare and France as a place of harmonious relations between the sexes. Françoise Giroud explains: "Two big centuries ago, the French invented a way of speaking amongst each other, of loving each other ñ Iím talking about men and women ñ and of making conversation, of having relationships that are a lot softer and sweeter than American relationships. There is no comparison. And thatís felt in the whole history of these last years." In this context, Giroud and Badinter argue that French women can negotiate most situations well on their own.

Likewise, Elisabeth Badinter describes American society as typified by asexual and distant social relations: "Do you see what kind of ideal [of relationships between men and women] shines through your examples? The comrade. Do you see what that means in French? Itís a bit like the model in Nordic society. In Sweden, itís like that. I find it terrifying, just terrifying!" Badinter juxtaposes this image with that of the French workplace, which she describes as a place of pleasant flirtation and playful seduction. She argues that this atmosphere should be preserved: "You know itís at work that people meet their lovers, their mistresses, who sometimes become their wives or husbands and sometimes donítÖ So if you start saying: ëOh, but a gaze a bit insistent or a reflection of bad taste is harassment,í thatís going to rule out the possibility that couples will form, that people will date, court, have flings (aventures). Itíll all be over."

There are people in the United States who also criticize sexual harassment policies as threats to "sexual freedom." However, in France, such arguments are often framed in opposition to the United States (e.g. Badinter 1991). Some French journalists and intellectuals contrast alleged French respect for vie privée (a personal sphere outside of state control) to American disregard for this principle, manifested in articles about politiciansí sex lives and in "over-zealous" sexual harassment laws. Yet this "French character" is contested by other French social actors, like members of the AVFT who criticize the "narrowness" of French sexual harassment law and the uneven protection of privacy among the powerful (men) and powerless (women). One French study of Mitterandís presidency, for instance, describes how the French press has targeted female French politiciansí physical appearance and sexual behavior (Jenson and Sineau 1995:334). Likewise, French scholars have denounced the fact that courts rarely respect rape victimsí privacy, but rather, scrutinize their sexual past for signs that they welcomed the assault (Mossuz-Lavau 1991). Activists at the AVFT express similar concerns about the privacy of sexual harassment plaintiffs.

In the interview and in a recent article, Marie-Victoire Louis regards negative caricatures of American feminists as a means to disqualify and intimidate French feminists (Louis 1999; see also Ezekiel 1995). Other AVFT activists and many of the French plaintiff lawyers I interviewed concur that myths about "American excesses" are often used to discredit their work. The need to dissociate themselves from such negative images reinforces national differences in approaches to sexual harassment. One young AVFT activist explains how such a social climate leads her to avoid the term "sexual harassment" altogether when describing her work. Instead, she speaks of sexual violence: "I prefer to talk about violence to women at work. [Ö] Because of this trend [that consists of saying that] women make up things, women invent things, the movie Disclosure, Demi MooreÖ ñ you canít imagine the damage that [movie] did to mentalities ñ ["sexual harassment"] is a totally discredited term. When people ask me what I do, I donít mention sexual harassment. Iím sure they would burst out laughing: ëoh but women make up stories, oh but sexual harassment, itís like in the United States. Itís anything goes. Itís all about making money in court cases.í No, I say that I work on violence towards women at work."

This study set out to explore how different national cultural repertoires shape representations of sexual harassment in France and the United States, in both formal law and among activists and public figures. I found that rhetoric about the market, ("minority") group-based concepts of inequality, productivity, and professionalism are more common in the United States, while arguments about interpersonal violence and abuse of power are more prevalent in France. These findings are consistent with those of the other chapters in this book and point to the robust nature of these particular elements in respective French and American cultural "tool kits" (Swidler 1986).

This chapter, however, also reveals that national cultural repertoires are neither stable nor universally agreed upon. For instance, in the United States, while Phyllis Schlafly and Camille Paglia stress the importance of a free labor market in their criticisms of "over-zealous" sexual harassment regulation, Catharine MacKinnon and 9to5 activists argue that some constraints must be imposed on the market to achieve gender equality. Likewise, French sexual harassment law uses the concept of violence to condemn only a bossí imposition of his sexual desires on one of his subordinates, but the AVFT activists define "sexual violence" more broadly to include, for example, pornography. In France, Elisabeth Badinter and Françoise Giroud argue that "French" cultural and political traditions, characterized by harmonious gender relations and respect for privacy, are inconsistent with "American" concepts of sexual harassment. Yet, members of the AVFT denounce as dangerous ideological rhetoric, such arguments about the nature of "French" political and cultural traditions. They dispute that "American" definitions of sexual harassment are inherently American or in any way incompatible with the pursuit of gender equality in France.

Sociologists of culture need not only to document cultural repertoires, but also to explore how different elements are contested or reinforced at particular historical moments. For instance, this study suggests that arguments about national specificity intensify when the principles for which they stand are increasingly challenged (see also Ezekiel 1995; Scott 1995; Louis 1999). Stated differently, "globalization," or "American imperialism," (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1998) does not erase local social actors, who interpret, translate and dispute symbolic meaning (see Fantasia 1995; Frenkel, Shenhav, and Herzog 1996; Guillén 1994, 1999; Fourcade-Gourinchas 1999). Unless serious attention is paid to historical change or contradictions across different national institutions and groups, cross-national studies run the risk of essentialism.

In this chapter, the law was examined as one important site of symbolic meaning. As a social code, the law has particular sway because it is backed by authority and ultimately force. Nonetheless, it is still a human-made code. This chapter examined briefly how various social actors, such as activists, politicians, lawyers, and judges, draw on cultural and material resources in struggles over legal definitions of sexual harassment. It found that, once institutionalized, legal definitions of sexual harassment are highly influential. Yet, social actors, including many of the respondents, often dispute, expand upon, or reinterpret legal definitions when making judgments about particular types of behavior. Social actors also challenge legal definitions more directly through proposed amendments to statutes and/or in court cases that aim to change jurisprudence.

Previous work has documented how social actors draw on cultural repertoires to make arguments (e.g. Lamont 1992). However, as this study of struggles over the particular issue of sexual harassment has shown, through such disputes, social actors can redefine the initial terms of the debate. For instance, contests over sexual harassment have challenged prevailing conceptions of gender, discrimination, sexuality, power, violence, law, the market, and the workplace, just to name a few. Social meaning is thus created and recreated in political struggles that are increasingly transcending national borders.

1. During a job interview for a position as sales representative, the boss invites the applicant to spend the weekend with him in San Francisco. He says heíll give his answer after the weekend.
2. A saleswoman complains that her boss calls her by her first name, often undresses her with his eyes, compliments her body, has asked her if she ever cheated on her husband, suggests they go out on a date, puts his hands on her buttocks.
3. The boss has been dating one of his subordinates. She is entirely consenting. But the other employees complain that the bossís mistress has privileges. They decide that they are penalized because they are not sleeping with the boss. They say this is a form of sexual harassment.
4. Pornographic posters are hanging behind the desk of an executive. One of his colleagues complains that she feels very uncomfortable every time she walks in his office. However, no other employee has ever complained.
5. Chris is known as a joker. Among other subjects, he often jokes about "dumb blondes," bad women drivers, or "bimbos." Despite these jokes, he claims to love women. He says they are closer to nature, more tender, give life... He sometimes says, in the tone of a joke, things like "Its up to the women to save the firm". Most of his colleagues laugh at his jokes but Sue finds them unbearable. She says that even his supposed compliments are generalizations that confine women to very limited roles and considers this a form of sexual harassment. She expresses her point of view but is not taken seriously because she is considered a "feminist".
6. A woman has been dating her boss. The relationship was completely consensual but now the woman wants to break up. She lets him know, but he does not want to end the relationship. He calls her several times a day on the phone, sends her letters, stops her in the hallway to discuss his suffering. She says that she canít work under these circumstances and complains that she is being sexually harassed.
7. A woman complains that her boss calls her "stupid," "incompetent," "slow". He doesnít make any sexual propositions, but she says that he does not have this attitude with male employees.
8. A female boss of a firm dates one of her employees. The relationship is completely consensual. However, when the female boss decides she wants to break up with him, her male subordinate refuses to accept her decision. He calls her incessantly on the phone. He sends her letters and flowers. He stops her in the hall to discuss his sorrow. She claims that not only is he not doing his work and preventing others from doing theirs, but that his behavior is disturbing and frightening. She says that he is sexually harassing her.
9. A male boss of a firm dates one of his female employees. He breaks up with her to go out with another female employee in the same firm. The ex-lover is hurt and insults the new lover. She makes allusions to the otherís sexual contact with the boss, humiliating her in front of their colleagues all of the time: "You slut, whore, you know heís only interested in one thing"... "Youíd do anything to get ahead, wouldnít you?"...