Philosophy 101: Dr. William O'Meara, (c) copyright, 1997
Text of Aristotle from an 1890's translation, 15 paragraphs selected from Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics each paragraph numbered.
After the complete text of these paragraphs, the reader will find a commentary to the paragraphs by number.
Questions for the Reading and the Commentary
1. If we always desire things for the sake of something else, how long would the process of des~ring things go on and what would be the effect upon our desire? Para. 3, lecture.
2. Which is the greater good, that of the individual or of the state, for Aristotle? Para. 4, lecture. How could you agree with him? Give an example that would support his view. How could you disagree with him? Give an example. How would Socrates answer these questions?
3. What kind of accuracy does Aristotle seek in ethics? Para.- 5 lecture. Why?
4. What is the point of the example about justice in my commentary, para. 5?
5. What is the relationship between the young and the study or ethics? Lecture: par. 6.
6. Why is a commitment to self-knowledge needed in order for this discussion of the goals of the human self to be helpful to the individual? Commentary, para. 6.
7. How can para. 6 be read to give Aristotle's answer to what the general goal of life is? How does this answer fit in with the idea that the secret of happiness is living in accord with one's conscience? How is Socrates in his trial a good example of this answer of Aristotle?
8. What is the general opinion about the goal of life?
9. If the general opinion is correct, it should fit certain criteria that the goal of 1ife should have. What are these criteria?
10. Why are these criteria appropriate?
11. Does the common opinion make sense when examined by these criteria? pare. 7-13: lecture andd commentary.
12. Give the argument that distinguishes between feeling happy and being happy.
13. Consequently, what kind of happiness is worth possessing? How does your answer to this last question fit in with Aristotle's answer to what the general goal of life is, which you just reflected upon two paragraphs above? See my commentary, para. 7-8.
14. Para. 14-15, lecture and commentary: What does Aristotle mean by the function of a human? What is his persuasive argument that a human does have a function? What is the function of a human?
15. When is a person truly good as a person (that is, morally good as a person)? Relate this last answer to the statement that the secret of happiness is living in accord with one's conscience?
16. Outline Aristotle's basic argument in ethics. Is the argument valid, that is, if the premises are true, must the conclusion be true?
17. What are the premises of the argument? What arguments can be made against the premises?
18. How would Aristotle respond? What arguments does Arlstotle offer for the truth of his premises?
19. Commentary: What is the function of a human as rational? What good habits perfect this function?
20. What is the function of a human as rational and emotional? What good habits perfect this function? Analyze two virtues to show specifically how they perfect this function.
21. What is the function of a human as social? What are the virtues that perfect this function?
22. How does Socrates's argument and life show that rationality is best developed in a context of friendship (in dialogue with friends similar to the kind of dialogue we are attempting to create in our small group discussions)?
23. How does Socrates's argument and life show that rationality is best developed in a context of justice in which each individual's longing to be one's own self by one's own questions and one's own answers is properly respected and affirmed?
24. How does Aristotle define virtue? How is wisdom central to the practice of every virture? What is the mean?
25. What is the just thing? the temperate thing? the courageous thing? Can these things be exactly predicted? Why?
26. Is the mean simply a middle of the road position? Explain.
27. What are three practical guidelines for achieving the right
28. does every action and feeling have a mean?
29. What is Aristotle's analysis of murder? Does the disagreement which people have over the morality of abortion show that Aristotle's view of murder is inadequate? Explain.
Below are additional questions for the reading in the text, "The Golden Mean"
Use questions 2,3,4, & 5 on pages 125-126 for this reading.
6. What does every human action aim at? So how does Aristotle define good? Does he mean "moral good" here? Explain.
7. Does Aristotle simply affirm that there is an ultimate end to human action? Explain.
8. How does nature give us virtue? How do we achieve virtue on the basis of what nature has given us? Analyze the examples of justice and courage and temperance to make Aristotle's point.
9. What is the virtue or excellence of a human?
10. Explain how virtue is a mean state.
11. Again, how does Aristotle define virtue?
12. From the point of view of its essence as grasped in the definition of virtue, what is virtue?
13. From the point of view of the highest good, what is virtue?
14. Explain whether or not every action admits of a mean state.
15. Explain whether or not every emotion admits of a mean state.
13. How is courage a mean?
14. Are the extremes opposed to the mean equally opposed to the mean? See the example of courage at the bottom of 99 and the example of temperance at the top of 100 in the text.
15. Why is it so hard to be virtuous? Explain.
16. What are some practical guidelines which Aristotle gives for aiming at the mean?
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE
Book I
Paragraph 1- Every art and every scientific inquiry, and similarly every action and purpose, may be said to aim at some good. Hence the good has been well defined as that at which all things aim. But it is clear that there is a difference in the ends; for the ends are sometimes activities, and sometimes results beyond the mere activities. Also, where there are certain ends beyond the actions, the results are naturally superior to the activities.
Paragraph 2. As there are various actions, arts, and sciences, it follows that the ends are also various. Thus health is the end of medicine, a vessel of ship-building, victory of strategy, and wealth of domestic economy. It often happens that there are a number of such arts or sciences which fall under a single faculty as the art of making bridles, and all such other arts as make the instruments of horsemanship, under horsemanship, and this again as well as every military action under strategy, and in the same way other arts or sciences under other faculties. But in all these cases the ends of the architectonic arts or sciences, whatever they may be, are more desirable than those of the subordinate arts or sciences, as it is for the sake of the former that the latter are themselves sought after. It makes no difference to the argument whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else beyond the activities as in the above mentioned sciences .
Paragraph 3. If it is true that in the sphere of action there is an end which we wish for its own sake, and for the sake of which we wish everything else, and that we do not desire all things for the sake of something else (for, if that is so, the process will go on ad in£ini£9m, and our desire will be idle and futile) it is clear that this will be the good or the supreme good. Does it not follow then that the knowledge of this supreme good is of great importance for the conduct of life, and that, i: we know it, we shall be like archers who have a mark at which to aim, we shall have a better chance of attaining what we want? But, if this is the case, we must endeavour to comprehend, at least in outline, its nature, and the science or faculty to which it belongs.
Paragraph 4. It would seem that this is the most authoritative or architectonic science or faculty, and such is evidently the political [ethics is a part of political science for Aristotle] for it is the political science or faculty which determines what sciences are necessary in states, and what kind of sciences should be learnt, and how far they should be learnt by particular people. We perceive too that the faculties which are held in the highest esteem, e.g. strategy, domestic economy, and rhetoric, are subordinate to it. But as it makes use of the other practical sciences, and also legislates upon the things to be done and the things to be left undone, it follows that its end will comprehend the ends of all the other sciences, and will therefore be the true good of mankind. For although the good of an individual is identical with the good of a state, yet the good of the state, whether in attainment or in preservation, is evidently greater and more perfect. For while in an individual by himself it is something to be thankful for, it is nobler and more divine in a nation or state.
Paragraph 5. These then are the objects at which the present inquiry aims, and it is in a sense a political [It is characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy to treat Ethics as a branch or department of Politics] inquiry. But our statement of the case will be adequate, if it be made with all such clearness as the subject-matter admits; for it would be as wrong to expect the same degree of accuracy in all reasonings as in all manufactures. Things noble and just, which are the subjects of investigation in political science, exhibit so great a diversity and uncertainty that they are sometimes thought to have only a conventional, not a natural, existence. There is the same sort of uncertainty in regard to good things, as it often happens that injuries result from them; thus there have been cases on which people were ruined by wealth, or again by courage. As our subjects then and our premises are of this nature, we must be content to indicate the truth roughly and in outline; and as our subjects and premises are true generally but not universally, we must be content to arrive at conclusions which are only generally true. It is right to receive the particular statements which are made in the same spirit; for an educated person will expect accuracy in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject allows; he might as well accept probable reasoning from a mathematician or require demonstrative proofs from a rhetorician.
Paragraph 6. But everybody is competent to judge the subjects which he understands and is a good judge of them. It follows that in particular subjects it is a person of special education, and in general a person of universal education, who is a good judge. Hence the young are not proper students of political science, as they have no experience of the actions of Fife which form the premises and subjects of the reasonings. Also it may be added that from their tendency to follow their emotions they will not study the subject to any purpose or profit, as its end is not knowledge but action. It makes no difference whether a person is young in years or youthful in character; for the defect of which I speak is not one of time but is due to the emotional character of his life and pursuits. Knowledge is as useless to such a person as it is to an intemperate person. But where the desires and actions of people are regulated by reason the knowledge of these subjects will be extremely valuable.
Paragraph 7. But having said so much by way of preface as to the students of political science, the spirit in which it should be studied, and the object which we set before ourselves, let us resume our argument as follows:
Paragraph 8. As every knowledge and moral purpose aspires to some good, what is in our view the good at which the political science aims, and what is the highest of all practical goods? As to its name there is, I may say, a general agreement. The masses and the cultured classes agree on calling it happiness, and conceive that "to live well" or "to do well" is the same thing as "to be happy. n But as to the nature of happiness they do not agree, nor do the masses give the same account of it as the philosophers. The former define it as something visible and palpable, e.g. pleasure, wealth, or honour; different people give different definitions of it, and often the same person gives different definitions at different times; for when a person has been ill, it is health, when he is poor, it is wealth, and, if he is conscious of his own ignorance, he envies people who use grand language above his own comprehension. Some philosophers on the other hand have held that, besides these various goods, there is an absolute good which is the cause of goodness in them all.
Paragraph 9. But leaving this subject for the present let us ~ the good of which we are in quest and consider what its nature may be. For it is clearly different in different actions or arts; it IS one thing in medicine, another in strategy, and so on. What then is the good in each of these instances? It is presumably that for the sake of which all else is done. This in medicine is health, in strategy, victory, in domestic architecture, a house, and so on. But in every action and purpose it is the end, as it is for the sake of the end that people all do everything else. If then there is a certain end of all action, it wilt be this which is the practicable good, and if there are several such ends it will be these.
Paragraph 10. Our argument has arrived by a different path at the same conclusion as before, but we must endeavour to elucidate it still further. As it appears that there are more ends than one and some of these, e.g. wealth, flutes, and instruments generally, we desire as means to something else, it is evident that they are not all final ends. But the highest good is clearly something final. Hence if there is only one final end, this will be the object of which we are in search, and if there are more than one, it will be the most final of them. We speak of that which is sought after for its own sake as more final than that which is sought after as a means to something else; we speak of that which is never desired as a means to something else as more final than the things which are desired both in themselves and as means to something else; and we speak of a thing as absolutely final, if it is always desired in itself and never as a means to something else.
Paragraph 11. It seems that happiness preeminently answers to this description, as we always desire happiness for its own sake and never as a means to something else, whereas we desire honour, pleasure, intellect, and every virtue, partly for their own sakes (for we should desire them independently of what might result from them) but partly also as being means to happiness, because we suppose they will prove the instruments of happiness. Happiness, on the other hand, nobody desires for the sake of these things nor indeed as a means to anything else at all.
Paragraph 12. We come to the same conclusion if we start from the consideration of self-sufficiency, if it may be assumed that the final good is self-sufficient. But when we speak of self-sufficiency, we do not mean that a person leads a solitary life all by himself, but that he has parents, children, wife, and friends, and fellow-citizens in general, as man is naturally a social being. But here it is necessary to prescribe some limits for if the circle be extended so as to include parents, descendants, and friends' friends, it will go on indefinitely. Leaving this point, however, for future investigation, we define the self-sufficient as that which, taken by itself, makes life desirable, and wholly free from want, and this is our conception of happiness.
Paragraph 12. Again, we conceive happiness to be the most sublime of all things, and that not merely as one among other good things. If it were one among other good things, the addition of the smallest good would increase its desirability; for the accession makes a superiority of goods, and the greater of two goods is always the most desirable. It appears then that happiness is something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all action.
Paragraph 14. Perhaps, however, it seems a truth which is commonly admitted, that happiness is the supreme good, what is wanted is to define its nature a little more clearly. The best way of arriving at such a definition will probably be to ascertain the function of a human being. For, as with a flute-player, a statuary, or any artisan, or in fact anybody who has a definite function and action, his goodness, or excellence seems to lie in his function, so it would seem to be with a human being, if indeed he has a definite function. Can it be said then that, while a carpenter and a cobbler have definite function and actions, a human, unlike them, is naturally functionless? The reasonable view is that, as the eye, the hand, the foot, and similarly each several parts of the body has a definite function, so humanity may be regarded as having a definite function apart from all these. What then, can this function be? It is not life; for life is apparently something which humanity shares with the plants, and it is something peculiar to humanity that we are looking for. We must exclude therefore the life of nutrition and increase. There is next what may be called the life of sensation. But this too, is apparently shared by humanity with horses, cattle, and all other animals. There remains what I may call the practical life of the rational part of a human being But the rational part is twofold; it is rational partly in the sense of being obedient to reason, and partly in the sense of possessing reason and intelligence. The practical life too may be conceived of in two ways, either as a moral state. or as a moral activity; but we must understand by it the life of activity, as this seems to be the truer form of the conception.
Paragraph 15. The function of humanity then is an activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not independently of reason. Again the functions of a person of a certain kind, and of such a person who is good of his kind e.g. of a harpist and a good harpist, are in our view generally the same, and this view is true of people of all kinds without exception, the superior excellence being only an addition to the function; for it is the function of a harpist to play the harp, and of a good harpist to play the harp well. This being so, if we define the function of humanity as a kind of life, and this life as an activity of soul, or a course of action in conformity with reason, if the function of a good person is such activity or action of a good and noble kind, and if everything is successfully performed when it is performed in accordance with its proper excellence, it follows that the good of the person is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue or, if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue. But is necessary to add the words "in a complete life. For as one swallow or one day does not make a spring, so one day or a short time does not make a fortunate or happy person.
Paragraph 1-2. Human nature, the human self, acts for goals or ends.
Paragraph 3-4. If human nature is directed to one goal or set of foals, then life should be consciously based on that goal. There 1S the problem of determining whether that goal, if there be such, is primarily social or individual or both social and individual. Is the state above the individual in all respects, or the individual above the state in all respects, or are the individual and state above the other in differing respects? This problem needs to be considered, later.
Paragraph 5. Diversity of human lives and cultures seems to indicate that men are not all directed to one goal or set of goals. Consequently if we can find one goal or set of goals that the human self seeks as a human person, we should expect that this goal or set of goals will offer only general guidelines for the attainment of those goals. The general guideline of justice of giving to others what is theirs usually means to return what you have borrowed. That is the usual way of acting justly. But if someone asks you to return a weapon when he is out of his senses with rage, then the usual way of acting would not be just, nor morally correct.
Paragraph 6. Commitment to self knowledge is needed in order for this discussion of the goals of the human self to be helpful to the individual. The individual who bases his goals on whatever his present emotion inclines him to is not willing to accept a reflective answer to the question of the goals of human life. Person who acts only on the basis of his immediate emotional feeling is immature. Even Epicures argued that immediate feeling is not a good guide to the goals of the human self.
At this point, Aristotle has already given his fundamental answer to the question of what is overall goal that the human person seeks if there is such a goal. He has said that the goal is to live as a mature person not as a immature person. The mature person has made the Socratic commitment in seeking to choose the goals of his life in light of his basic commitment to the goal of living the reflective or examined life. If an individual is willing to reflectively discuss this problem of what is the overall goal that the human individual seeks if there be such a goal, the individual is tentatively committing himself to the overall goal of living the examined life. What Aristotle has to do now is to show the individual that living the examined life is indeed the overall goal that the person should seek. He will do this by means of his discussion of happiness and a human being’s function.
Paragraph 7-8. Verbally, there is generally agreement that the goal of life is to be happy: being happy is living well and doing well. But beyond the verbal agreement, people in general and even individuals at various times of their lives have different opinions. The fact that people change their opinion about what happiness is shows that human nature is indeed limited in the goals that will make the person happy; not just any goal will make the person happy. The Individual even limits his own goals. For example, when he is sick, he wants to be healthy. We should distinguish between feeling happy and being happy. Immediate feeling is not a good guide to either health or happiness. For Oust as an individual can feel healthy but be sick, so also can an individual feel happy but not be possessing the goals that satisfy his longings as a human person. Similarly, just as an individual can feel healthy and be healthy, so also can the individual feel happy and be happy (possessing the goals that satisfy his human nature). Consequently, the kind of happiness that is worth possessing is happiness that is approval by reflection; immediate feeling as not the best guide to the goals that satisfy the human self.
Paragraph 9-13. If there is a final goal that will satisfy human nature, it is that which is desirable in itself, for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else. Happiness is indeed such a thing, always chosen for its own sake. The common opinion is correct.
If there is a final goal, it is that which is sufficient by itself to satisfy man's longings. Happiness does appear to be such a thing, sufficient by itself to satisfy the longings of the human person. This is the very way in which we use the word happiness--to mean satisfaction. We say: 'If only I were happy or satisfied in what I am doing, then I would lack for nothing.' So again, the common opinion that happiness is the final goal of man seems to be correct. It does seem likely therefore that humanity does have a final goal.
Paragraph 14-15. But to say that happiness is humanity’s goal is only a platitude; we need a clearer account of what human happiness will consist in. If a thing such as a knife has a function or purpose, an activity peculiar to itself, then we say that such a thing as a knife is a good thing, a good knife, if it performs its function well. Now if human nature has a definite function or activity peculiar to it, then human nature can be made good or perfected only if it fulfills that function. Humanity’s function is not the life of nutrition and growth, not the life of sensation and emotion, but the life of reflection and choice.
So if the function of man is choice in accordance with reflection, then human goodness, goal, or happiness consists in attaining that function as well as can be. Then the goodness of a person is the life of actions chosen in accordance with the well thought out life.
The Specific Virtues of a Human Being
Aristotle identifies this life as the life of virtues which in Greek means the life of excellence or good habits that enable people to attain their function. Just as the habit of swimming enables the swimmer to swim well, so also human nature will be shown to have habits such as practical wisdom (prudence), courage, temperance, and others that enable the person to live wisely (to attain one’s function in the best way possible). Reason studies the nature of humanity in order to find out what goals it tends towards and approves of certain habits as the necessary means for the achieving of the overall goal or set of goals that human nature is meant for. Aristotle recognizes that there is an important cultural, educational influence upon human nature in the child that influences the overall set of goals of the human person, but nevertheless he tries to identify the goals of man as a rational animal.
As rational, the human function (our experienced emotional longing) is to be reflective. Human reflection is perfected by the good habits of science, mathematics, and philosophy; by the good habits of the practical arts; and by the good habit of practical wisdom. As rational, our human function (or experienced longing) is to make free choices in accordance with reflection.
As emotional and rational, the human function (our experienced emotional longing) is to be emotional in a reasonable way. To be emotional in a reasonable way is to act temperately, courageously, even-temperedly. Temperance is the habit of acting intelligently when subject to the emotional longings for food, drink, and sex. The longing for these things by themselves, say Stumpf, could easily 'go wild.' In themselves they do not contain any principle of measure or selection. (I, 108) The emotional life of the individual could easily prevent fulfillment of all of one’s rational desires. Consequently, our emotional nature can reach its function well only by being directed by our rational nature. This general point is illustrated also in the virtue of courage. Courage is the habit of acting intelligently in circumstances that appear to us frightening or alarming. Fear by itself could easily dominate an individual's life in a situation when danger threatens. By itself, the emotional reaction cannot tell whether the danger is a real one or only an apparent one. Human intelligence must be brought to bear on this problem and should direct one’s response so that both one’s emotional and rational nature can be fulfilled.
As social, the human function is to value the rationality and freedom of all other rational beings just as we values our own rationality and freedom. The habits that enable us to attain this function well are the virtues of justice and friendship. As Socrates both argued and lived out his argument, human rationality is best developed in the context which is social, in dialogue that respects the individual's longing to be one’s own self by one’s own questions and answers. Justice is the habit which enables the Individual to respond intelligently and fairly to the demands that other individuals place upon the self.
Definition of Virtue
Aristotle defines virtue as: 'a habit of the self in which, when it has to choose among actions and feelings, it observes the mean relative to us, this being determined by such a rule or principle as would take shape in the mind of a person of practical wisdom and experience.' By this definition, Aristotle is affirming that every person is capable of being guided by the universal moral ideal in many situations and that no detailed rules can be set up in advance for every situation. By the term 'mean' Aristotle is saying that usually either too much or too little of anything is bad. This point is a generalization from experience; the person of experience, of practical wisdom, makes such a generalization. For example, too much food is bad, and so is too little food. Overweight can kill and so can starvation. But the right amount of food varies for each individual person. For example, an athlete will have a different need for food than a young child. What is the right amount of food for one person is not the same as it is for another. However, both should eat 'temperately,' namely, the right amount, in the right way, at the right times, on the right occasions, with the right motive--as a person of practical experience and wisdom would decide what would be right.
The Practice of Virtue
Generally, the person of practical wisdom says to himself that one should always do the just thing, the temperate thing, the courageous thing, the practically wise thing. For these things are the necessary means of perfecting human nature. The just thing is that which respects other persons in their moral nature, that is, as rational and free beings, and gives fitting response to each person according to his merit or demerit. The temperate thing is that which allows the bodily appetites to be satisfied without any harm to the person’s rational needs such as the needs for friendship and the reflective life. The courageous thing is that which meets dangers to one's attempt at living the Socratic commitment. What is the just thing, the courageous thing, the temperate thing or the practically wise thing can never be exactly predicted because of all the changes that occur in life. But they can be predicted in general, says Aristotle. In general, the virtuous person, the person of excellence, acts prudently, temperately, justly, and courageously.
The mean of virtue should not be confused with mediocrity. The mean is not simply a middle of the road position, but the most reasonable course of action one can take in a given situation. Avoiding two extremes is the high point of practical wisdom. But to sustain the mean of virtue in all human conduct is an extremely difficult task; it requires using one's judgment habitually and building up the steady moral effort necessary to keep the proper balance between the two extremes.
- Aristotle gives three practical rules for achieving the right mean:
1. Avoid first that extreme that is more opposed to the mean. For example, if while driving you must choose between hitting a pedestrian or a fence, choose the fence.
2. Consider your natural inclinations and act accordingly, keeping in mind your strengths and weaknesses. For example, if you are very brave, take care not to behave rashly; or you tend to drink immoderately, avoid drinking altogether.
3. Beware of immoderate pleasures. For example, Mark Anthony's downfall stemmed from overindulgence in sexual pleasure.
Some Actions and Feelings Have No Virtuous Mean
In the text, pages 98-99, Aristotle argues that not every action nor every passion admits of a 'mean' since the very names of some actions imply badness such as adultery and murder. There is no mean between excessive murder and too little murder which would be just the right amount of murder. There is no such thing as acting virtuously in committing murder against the right person, at the right time, and in the right way.
Why is murder evil in itself? Aristotle has not answered this question clearly in his writings.
I believe that Aristotle's position on murder might be supported in the following way. If we define murder as killing another person, we cannot say that killing is always wrong. In wartime, people generally agree that it is highly virtuous to defend one's country by killing the right persons in the opposing country, in the right way, and at the right time. So by murder, he is referring to the taking of life of an innocent person, a person who is not harmful. It is true that people generally agree that the taking of an innocent person's life is immoral, that murder as so defined is always wrong. Aristotle could explain that murder is immoral because it violates the moral nature (the human nature) of the person being killed. For murder prevents that individual's humanity from being fulfilled in reasonable and free actions. However, people will disagree about what persons are innocent and what persons are harmful. Further, they will disagree about what constitutes a person. For example, some people will argue that the unborn human fetus is properly considered a human person, a potential human being capable of actualizing itself into a mature person given the proper environment of the mother's uterus and parental education after birth. Yet others will argue that the unborn fetus is not human. Further, people will argue about whether or not the fetus of a rape is harmful or innocent. Such difficult cases require further study. However, one could still accept Aristotle's concept of human nature and the values that perfect it regardless of how one solves the difficult case of abortion.
Aristotle's Ethics: Stanford Internet Encyclopedia
Aristotle (with Excellent Overview of His Ethics): Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Virtue Theory: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aristotle's Teleological View (Every Being Understood by its Built-in Goal or Telos)
PHILOSOPHY QUICK GUIDE NO. 5: ARISTOTLE'S PRACTICAL WORKS
Brief Comparison between Aristotle's, Kant's, and John Stuart Mill's Ethics
The Ultimate Happiness of a Human Being (Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle)
Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand as Developed from Aristotle