Questions for Reading The Continuing Quest

Reading 17: John Stuart Mill

Answer the questions 1-6 on page 126 for this reading. Also answer the following questions:

7. What is the relationship between general theory and particular truths in science? in morality and legislation? P. 108

8. What is Mill's evaluation of Kant's morality? P. 109

9. Are questions of ultimate ends amenable to direct proof? P. 109. Explain. What are Mill's examples?

10. What grounds does Mill offer for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula? Explain after you have correctly stated the meaning of the formula.

11. In what have the utilitarian writers in general placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures? In contrast, what does Mill try to do? P. 111

12. How is Mill's view of a difference of quality in pleasures consistent with the fact that people "occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone" the higher pleasures for the lower ones? Page 112.

13. What does Mill believe has happened to the ones who "devote themselves exclusively to the" lower pleasures? Explain his answer. Page 112-113.

14. From the verdict of the only competent judges of the different kinds of pleasure, does Mill believe there can be any appeal? Why or why not? P. 113.

15. What is the ultimate end of human action according to Utilitarianism? What is the relationship between this end and the standard of morality? P. 113.

1. Who was Mill's father? What book did Mill read after which he dedicated himself to become a reformer of the world?

2. What experience did he go through and what did he learn from it when he was 20?

3. What is the hedonistic paradox?- What is the answer to the paradox in the handout? (I mean, what is one way of understanding this paradoxical situation in the handout? What other way did we identify in our class discussion?)

4. What is the basic position of Mill in ethics? What grounds does Mill offer to establish what the ultimate end of action is? What are the kinds of pleasures? How does Mill establish that there are different kinds of pleasure?

5. What is the basic moral principle for Mill? For Kant? How does Mill establish his basic moral principle? How does Kant? If an individual rejects Mill's position, how does Mill reply? If an individual rejects Kant's position, how does Kant reply?

6. What is Stumpf's objection to Mill's argument? How would Mill reply? What is the basis of conscience for Mill?

7. How would Mill respond to the question about how we can pass from the fact that we have social feelings to the value, to the obligation to do so? Explain Mill's answer.

8. What are the basic elements of the ideal of individuality?

9. What does Mill have to say about Wilhelm von Humboldt's position in ethics? What will develop originality? How does Mill defend this ideal of originality? (Of course, originality and individuality are referring to the same ideal.)

10. How would Mill, then, answer Stumpf's objection? What is the key first premise of Mill's answer? What second premise and what conclusion would you add to complete the key first premise? How would you defend the truth of that first premise? How would you defend the truth of the second premise which you have added? Is the argument valid which you have constructed, that is to say, is the conclusion necessarily true if the premises are true?

11. Again, what is Stumpf's objection to Mill? (2nd last paragraph of lecture) What was the answer which I offered for Mill here in class? What is the answer offered in the lecture? What is another way of answering Stumpf's objection? Explain.

John Stuart Mill was born in 1806 and educated by his father, James Mill, a friend of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham is the founder of Utilitarianism by the book First Principles of Morals and Legislation. He defends the general Epicurean doctrine that pleasure is the end of human action, that pleasures do not differ qualitatively and that the first principles of morals and legislation is to achieve the greatest happiness (pleasure) for the greatest number of people. He resolved to be like him-- a reformer of the world:

My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object. The personal sympathies I wished for were those of fellow laborers in this enterprise; it was something durable and distant toward which I could always make progress while it could never be exhausted by complete attainment...But the time came when I awakened from this as from a dream. It was the autumn of 1826. I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is occasionally liable to: unsusceptible to enjoyment or pleasureable excitement, one of those moods when what is pleasure at other times becomes insipid or indifferent...In this frame of mind it occurred to me to put the question to myself, suppose that all the objects in my life were realized; that all changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could completely be effected this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you? No, I seemed to have nothing left to live for.

He remained convinced of the position that the pleasure of sympathy with human beings, and the feelings which made the good of others were the greatest and surest sources of happiness. "But to know that the feeling would make me happy if I had it did not give me the feeling. My education," he wrote, had failed to develop these feelings in sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of intellectual analysis." For he was unable to prove bv reason as Kant or Aristotle had done that such was the end that man ought to live for. He asked himself if his life could be lived in such a forlorn state of mind, and he thought that he could not possibly bear it beyond a year.

A half a year later, he was reading Marmontel's Memories about Marmontel's poor childhood, the death of his father, and how he asserted to his family that he would care for them. This passage moved Mill to tears. He recovered the ability to find joy in life, happiness with others, even though he could not prove this was the goal in life. He wrote:

The experience of this period had two effects on my opinions: 1) They led me to adopt a theory of life, very unlike that held before... I kept the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But now this end was only to be attained by not making it direct end. Only those are happy who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness. Once one makes the enjoyment of life the end of life, such enjoyments are immediately felt to be insufficient. The only chance is to treat not happiness but some end external to it as the purpose of life. Let your self-consciousness and self-interrogation exhaust themselves on that and if otherwise you experience happiness, do not question it. 2) I gave to the internal culture of the individual its proper place among the prime necessities of human well-being. The passive susceptibilities (the emotions) need to be cultivated as well as the active capabilities (intellect and will). The maintenance of a due balance among the faculties, now seemed to me of primary importance. The cultivation of feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed.

Mill's crisis and the comparable problem in his philosophy is known as the hedonistic paradox: one must seek not to develop one's own happiness directly as the end of life, but yet it is the end of life. One way of understanding this paradoxical situation is to say that one who seeks his own happiness directly and alone will not find it precisely because that is not the only end of human action. For human nature has social feelings which should receive proper development along with the development of feeling for one's self.

Mill's position in ethics: The fundamental principle of morals is taken from the end of action. An action is right insofar it tends to produce happiness. Happiness is the avoidance of pain and experiencing of pleasure. These two are the only things desirable as ends for man. Mill does not prove this definition but tries to show that this sense of happiness is what experience discloses. There are rational grounds (evidence from experience but not proof that is unchallengeable) for accepting the principle of morals. These rational grounds are the analysis of human experience to show that in fact we do only seek happiness as the only end of human action. Human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means to happiness. For people desire nothing but pleasure. The experience of the self shows that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are inseparable phenomena or two aspects of one and the same overall experience.

The end of human action is not indiscriminate pleasure, but pleasure as judged by competent men such as Socrates rather than an ordinary man, a man instead of a pig. Pleasures differ qualitatively. However, there is no proof from reason that the 'rational' pleasures differ qualitatively from 'sense' pleasures. But there are rational grounds (evidence from experience) for so holding. This rational ground is that it is an experiential, emotional-volitional preference to one who experiences all the pleasures that:

few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.

The intelligent human person is unwilling to change places with such people because he possesses a sense of dignity in his human abilities which he prefers to preserve rather than lose by being animal-like. The reason of Mill for his basic ethical principle is quite similar to Kant's reason for his basic ethical principle, the value of the human person. Both are basing moral judgements on the dignity of the human person. Kant defends this value by pure reflection: a rational, free being necessarily wills the value of every such being. Mill defends this value by appeal to feeling: the human person has a sense of pride in one's independence, in one'sfreedom, which one prefers to keep rather than to lose by enslaving the self to the lower pleasures. If an individual rejects Mill's position, Mill can only say that his feelings were not properly developed. If an individual rejects Kant's position, Kant tries to show that a rational rejection of the basic value of reason and choice in the person is impossible because such a rejection is irrational, inconsistent.

Stumpf believes that this argument of Mill is weak at this point. People can desire the general happiness and do desire the general happiness, but that fact does not require that they ought to desire the general happiness. Stumpf says that at this point Mill appeals beyond the experience of pleasure to an internal obliging force, the conscience of the individual. Stumpf, however, does not make clear the basis of conscience for Mill and makes it appear to be an arbitrary choice on Mill's part. However, Mill carefully tried to analyze conscience in the following way:

Conscience is the pain more or less intense attendant on the violation of duty: it is the result of each person's unique development; it arises from the complex experience of his part life, social, moral, and at times, religious. Due to this extremely complicated origin, many believe it to be mysterious. Many affirm then that there is some mysterious universal law obliging all men.

But Mill holds that:

the bonding force of conscience consists in all the emotional history of the individual as that individual's feelings were developed by one's social group. As an acquired ability or habit, conscience is susceptible of being brought by cultivation to a high degree of development. Unfortunately, it is also susceptible to cultivation in any direction by external sanctions and early impression, so that it could direct the individual to any evil or absurd actions. If conscience were simply based upon one's culture, then moral feelings are relative only to one's culture and do not have a basis in human nature. Therefore, if the Principle of Utility is to be true for all people, it needs a solid basis in human nature. This firm foundation is the social feelings of humankind (a qualitatively better feeling), the desire to be one with our fellow creatures which is a natural inclination and which tends to be strengthened by the advancement of civilization. In every age some advance is made toward a state in which it will be possible to live on equal terms with everyone. As a result of this advancement, we grow up unable to concelve as possible a state of total disregard for others; we identify our feelings more and more with the good of others.

Social feelings exist very weakly in the human infant. If the culture develops these feelings, the individuals who have these feelings and also experience feelings against the dignity of others will for the most part prefer to live a life based on social feelings which respect the dignity of other persons as much as they respect the dignity of themselves. Of course, the objection can be raised. Why ought the individual develop social feelings? The fact that most people prefer to do so does not mean that they are right in doing so. How can we pass from the fact that people want to develop their social feelings to the value, to the obligation to do so?

Mill's answer to this question is made in his essay, On Liberty. There he affirms, "I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded in the permanent interests of man as a progressive being." In other words, if one wants to perfect one's nature, to develop the permanent interests of a human being as a progressive being, then one ought to develop certain ways of action such as habitual respect for the freedom of other persons. He writes:

In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to other...As much compression (restriction, that is) as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens-of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is much ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people, and even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have thee good of others for their object.

The ideal of individuality comprises three basic elements:

first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

Mill refers most favorably to the doctrine of Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Sphere and Duties of Government: "the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reasons, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. Hence Mill concludes

that therefore, the object towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and which especially those who design to influence their fellow men must even keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development; that for this there are two requisites, freedom, andd variety of situations; and then from the union of these arise individual vigor and manifold diversity which combine themselves in originality.

Mill defends this ideal by affirming:

that no one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another . . .On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience, had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another.

Mill develops from this basic agreement that people do in fact have about what is excellence in human conduct the following argument:

He who lets the world, or his own portion of it choose has plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the apelike one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided.... It is possible that he might be guided in some good path. and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the words of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting, beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself.

Mill answers Stumpf's objection, then, in the following way: We can derive the value of human life from the fact of human nature. Human nature is essentially a striving fact, not a fact closed to development.

First Premise: It we want to perfect human nature and develop the potentiality for individuality and originality along with the harmonious development of all man's abilities, emotional and rational, then we ought to act reflectively, freely, decisively, justly--especially justly--since this virtue enables not only one's individual self to develop but also one's social self, the others in the world.

Second Premise: The qualitatively better feelings approve perfecting human nature and developing the potentiality for individuality and originality along with the harmonious development of all human abilities.

The conclusion is obvious.

Stumpf locates the crucial part of Mill's argument in the sentence: "The only evidence that object is visible is that people see it, that an object is audible is that people hear it, and that an object is desirable is that people do actually desire it." Mill then writes: "No reason can be glven why the general happiness is desirable except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness." Stumpf has argued that desirable is not related to desired the same way in which visible and audible are related to seeing and hearing. Visible means that something is capable of being seen, desirable implies something is worthy of being desired, something that ought to be desired. One answer for Mill is that human experience shows to most people that happiness is the only thing desired as the ultimate end of conduct. So if we really want to be happy, that is, if we want to perfect human nature, then we ought to act in ways that do in fact perfect human nature. Not just any kind of action can bring the human potentiality to a harmonious development. Only the virtues lead to the qualitatively better happiness, that is, to true happiness.

Another way of answering Stump's objection would be to add to Mill's statement about the general happiness being desirable because each man desires his own happiness the statement that every person is equal in his right to pursue happiness. Consequently, one cannot pursue, or ought not in this perspective, to pursue actions which harm others' individuality and originality. Mill would defend his view that every person is equal by appeal to the preference of the experienced man that the Socratic life is better than the life of the fool.

• Utilitarian and other Approaches to Capital Punishment (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• Utilitarian and other Approaches to Animal Rights (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• Utilitarian and Other Ap[proaches to Suicide (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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