

# What about the univores? Musical dislikes and group-based identity construction among Americans with low levels of education<sup>☆</sup>

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## Abstract

This study uses data on musical dislikes to provide evidence for Peterson's (1992) theory of low-status cultural exclusiveness. Following his description of cultural univores, I hypothesize that respondents with low levels of education will be more likely than other respondents to have group-based musical dislikes. Sixteen music genres evidenced greater group-based taste distinctions for those with low levels of education than for persons with high levels of education, and the two genres representing high culture produced no significant results (as expected). There is strong evidence that less educated Americans pattern their musical taste more around race, ethnicity, religious conservatism, and geographic region. The paper concludes with suggestions for further development of theory and research around the omnivore–univore pattern of taste.

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## 1. Introduction

We use goods such as housing, clothing, music and food not only for comfort and survival but to make statements about ourselves, who we are and how we are similar to or different from other people. Thus a tie-dyed tee shirt conveys a different message about its wearer than do western boots and an extra-large silver belt-buckle. Furthermore, the relationships between goods can translate (roughly) into relationships between people; at least they can give us a clue. Who is more likely to befriend the person eating an alfalfa-sprout sandwich – the person in the tie-dye or the one in boots? These sets of symbols are often organized around other characteristics. Bourdieu (1984), for instance, shows how people use knowledge about music and art to display social class membership, while Peterson (1992) suggests ways that other taste groups may form around race, ethnicity, age, gender or region. The per-

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son with the wide silver buckle and boots is probably (though not definitely) male, and the one in tie-die is likely to be white.<sup>1</sup>

Peterson and Simkus suggest that “musical taste serves to mark not only status levels but also the status boundaries between groups defined by age, gender, race, region, religion, lifestyle, etc. at roughly the same stratum level” (1992). They show that high status individuals have a wider, “omnivorous” range of musical taste and consumption than lower status “univores” who are *believed* to adhere to more specific sub-cultural spheres defined by race, age and region.

I test this second part of the theory using data from the 1993 General Social Survey.<sup>2</sup> Focusing on the exclusive function of taste, I show that musical *dislikes* are used to construct group boundaries based on racial, ethnic, religious and regional identity, especially at low levels of education.

## 2. Background

Weber (1978: 926–940), Veblen (1953) and Bourdieu (1984) all suggest that cultural consumption and taste can be seen as symbolic communication and a means of establishing social relationships, networks and status groups. (See also Collins, 1978; Douglas and Isherwood, 1979; Gans, 1985; DiMaggio, 1987; Lamont, 1992; Bryson, 1996.) It has also been argued that the symbolic communication of status is much more important in modern times and urban environments because of the frequency of superficial social contacts in these locations (Veblen, 1953; Form and Stone, 1957).

Furthermore, the distinguishing mechanism of status culture is “cultural exclusion” (Bryson, 1996). Taste is theorized to act as the basis of social exclusion (Bourdieu, 1984; Lamont and Lareau, 1988) by which one group prevents other groups from gaining access to valuable resources such as educational credentials (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977), business contacts (Kanter, 1977), and marital partners (DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985; Kalmijn, 1994).

Peterson, Simkus, and Kern (Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Peterson, 1992; Peterson and Kern, 1996) suggest that people with lower levels of education dislike more types of music than their more educated counterparts *because* they adhere to group-specific subcultures that prescribe one or more types of music and, in effect, prescribe others. In this paper, therefore, I consider race/ethnicity, education, income, gender, age, religion, and region as possible bases of social group formation

<sup>1</sup> These cultural patterns are, no doubt, the material of stereotypes, but there is evidence that disempowered groups use these cultural resources to construct coping strategies or new bases of power (Hebdige, 1979; Radway, 1991). Elijah Anderson (1990), for instance, has shown how young African-American men can use rap music (at high volume) as a source of power to intimidate others and dominate public space.

<sup>2</sup> The GSS is a nearly annual survey of Americans over age eighteen conducted by the National Opinion Research Center which uses a stratified random sampling method. See Davis and Smith (1993) for an elaboration of sampling methods and other specifics of the GSS. For a detailed discussion of this “module” on culture, see Marsden and Swingle (1993).

(Collins, 1979), taste publics (Gans, 1985), or status groups (Weber, 1946). These “demographic variables”, then, become significant in so far as real people give meaning to social categories (e.g. youth) and attach other symbols (e.g. skateboards) and meanings (e.g. rebellious) to those categories.

The significance of asking whether less educated people have more differentiated tastes ranges far beyond finding successful marketing strategies. Status cultures can have serious political consequences. The high-status omnivore versus low-status univore pattern is one that implies more powerful people in the United States have a more unified culture than less powerful people. A pattern of low-status cultural exclusiveness around group identities discourages the class-based framing of common problems and collective action. On the high status end, broad taste helps to make their social structure seem at once diverse and unified (Peterson and Kern, 1996). For the omnivore, then, cultural distance can apparently be traversed with the flip of a radio dial.

The omnivore-univore pattern introduced by Peterson (1992) is one that unites powerful people in denying the *social* significance of *cultural* difference while separating less powerful people into differentiated cultural camps. Empirical tests of this important theory, however, have focused almost exclusively on the broadening of high status culture. Therefore, we have strong evidence that high-status people in the United States have broader tastes than low-status people (Peterson and Simkus, 1992), that the breadth has increased over time (Peterson and Kern, 1996), and that the breadth is a *form* of status distinction rather than an *end* of status distinction (Bryson, 1996).

I test the hypothesis, derived from the work of Peterson and his associates, that taste boundaries are formed around gender, age, racial, ethnic, religious, and regional identity *more at low levels of education than they are at high levels*. I use logistic regressions to calculate the odds of disliking various musical genres for each group and for the portion of that group with less than twelve years of education (using interaction terms). I create one of these equations for each of eighteen genres of music and present here the predicted probabilities for the relationships that are statistically significant. The eighteen genres are listed in Table 1 along with the percentage of the total sample who reported disliking each.

Table 1  
Percent of total sample who reported disliking each genre or disliking it very much on a 5-point scale

Genre	% Disliking	Genre	% Disliking
Bluegrass	19.7%	New Age/Space	50.1%
Blues/Rythm & Blues	17.6%	Oldies	15.6%
Classical/Chamber	25.0%	Opera	51.5%
Country/Western	14.6%	Pop/Rock	24.9%
Easy Listening	15.6%	Rap	65.6%
Folk	22.5%	Reggae	32.2%
Gospel	16.8%	Latin/Salsa	34.3%
Heavy Metal	73.1%	Show Tunes	21.9%
Jazz	23.0%	Swing/Big Band	17.8%

Note: The number of valid responses for each item ranges from 1,645 to 1,650.

This approach will provide a complex description of the interaction between education and other bases of group identity. I do not expect all genres to produce significant interaction terms. For instance, there is no reason to expect less educated respondents to differ from each other in terms of their dislike for classical music. At the same time, other genres might be important markers of a racial/ethnic boundary while proving fairly irrelevant to gender. The test lies in the big picture. Is there ample evidence of a greater tendency for less educated respondents to form their dislikes along demographic group boundaries?

### 3. Findings

Using the same data and coding scheme, I have shown elsewhere that less educated respondents do report disliking more genres overall than do those who have more education (Bryson, 1996). Thus, even within various demographic groups, those who have less education should be more likely to dislike many of the eighteen genres. Logistic regression models allow us to examine the special case of less educated group members *while controlling for* the overall effects of both education and the various other group identities.

Figs. 1 through 4 represent the predicted probability of disliking each type of music for only the groups and genres whose interaction terms were significant. For instance, the interaction between being southern and having less than a high school education is significant for disliking Latin music, so, in Fig. 2, I've presented the probability of disliking Latin music for Southerners with no high school diploma, non-Southerners with no high school diploma, Southerners with at least a high school diploma and non-Southerners with at least a high school diploma (for otherwise average respondents). Results from the full models are reported in Appendix A.

I've presented the results graphically because the predicted probabilities are less important than the differences among the four groups. A significant interaction effect could also occur in the case where *higher* educated group members had a different taste pattern than either non-group members or the less educated (a non-finding). The test, then, lies not only in the significance of the interaction term, but in the relative size of each coefficient (group, education, group-education interaction, and intercept). Therefore, supportive results must have (a) a significant interaction effect, and (b) a greater difference between less educated groups than between more educated groups in their probability of disliking the music genre.

If the relationship between musical taste and group identity is stronger at low levels of education than at other levels, we expect to see the largest differences in the probability of disliking a genre between the first and second columns of each set in Figs. 1 through 4 – the two groups with low education.

#### 3.1. *Black, white, Hispanic and "other" Americans*

Fig. 1 shows that interactions with race and ethnicity were significant for four of the eighteen genres.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, in each case, the difference between the height of




Fig. 1. Predicted probabilities of disliking a genre for racial groups whose interactions terms were significant ( $p < 0.10$  in logistic regression models. *Note:* Full logistic regression results are reported in Appendix A. Probabilities were calculated for the mean value of each variable in the model except the three involved in the predictions (i.e. race, education, and race  $\times$  education). The probability of disliking a genre is equal to  $1/1+e^{-(\alpha+\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2+\dots+\beta_nX_n)}$ .

the first two columns is greater than the difference between the second two. Among respondents with less than a high school education, Hispanics and non-whites dislike bluegrass, country, and easy listening more than whites and more than respondents with more education regardless of racial or ethnic identity. Furthermore, whites of all educational levels, and Hispanics with at least a high school diploma, dislike rap more than Hispanics with low education.

These results support my prediction. People with low levels of educational attainment use bluegrass, country, rap, and (to a lesser extent) easy listening to mark racial distinctions more than their counterparts who have at least a high school diploma. I did not find evidence that ethnic groups used any of the other 18 genres (such as classical or popular music) in a similar way.

### 3.2. Southern and non-southern residence

Fig. 2 shows that seven of the eighteen genres produced significant interactions with region. In this case, six of the seven significant interactions follow the expected pattern. Southerners with low education dislike oldies, pop, reggae, new age and Latin music while it is less educated non-Southerners who most often dislike gospel. That is, for the other genres in Fig. 2, the effect we seek (a difference between the first two columns) is clearly the most interesting. For swing, however, the overall difference between the first pair of columns (Southerners and non-Southerners with less education) and the second pair (the two groups with more education) is more

<sup>3</sup> All three dummy variables for race and ethnicity produce significant interactions in the model for disliking country music. Thus, the total number of interactions is six.




Fig. 2. Predicted probabilities of disliking a genre for regional groups whose interactions terms were significant ( $p < 0.10$  in logistic regression models. *Note:* Full logistic regression results are reported in Appendix A. Probabilities were calculated for the mean value of each variable in the model except the three involved in the predictions (i.e. region, education, and region  $\times$  education). The probability of disliking a genre is equal to  $1/1+e^{-(\alpha+\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2 \dots + \beta_nX_n)}$ .




Fig. 3. Predicted probabilities of disliking a genre for age differences where interactions with age were significant ( $p < 0.10$  in logistic regression models. *Note:* Full logistic regression results are reported in Appendix A. Probabilities were calculated for the mean value of each variable in the model except the three involved in the predictions (i.e. race, education, and race  $\times$  education). The probability of disliking a genre is equal to  $1/1+e^{-(\alpha+\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2 \dots + \beta_nX_n)}$ .

obvious. The difference in probabilities of disliking swing between less educated Southerners and their non-Southern counterparts, however, is significantly greater than the more educated pair of groups. Nonetheless, this effect is far overshadowed by the overall effect of education.

### 3.3. *Older and younger Americans*

In Fig. 3, where I report significant interactions between age and education, consistency in the direction of interaction effects begins to wane. There were seven significant age interactions, but their patterns are less clear.<sup>4</sup> For easy listening, folk and show tunes, the major group difference seems to be that younger people are generally more exclusive while it is the older respondents who are generally more exclusive of popular music. The significant interaction term for swing was the result of the strong tendency for highly educated young respondents to dislike that genre more than anyone else. Two types of music do, however, show the pattern expected. For both blues and jazz, age differences are greater at low levels of education than they are for respondents with at least a high school diploma. The findings for age interactions, then, are mixed. Age does seem to be an important determiner of taste, but while the effects are often stronger among the less educated, it remains important at all educational levels.

### 3.4. *Men, women, and conservative Protestants*

Finally, Fig. 4 presents the remaining interactions – gender and religion. These variables together produced only five significant interaction effects, and four do not follow the expected pattern. In only one case does musical dislike (for new age music) distinguish two groups (conservative Protestants and others) better at low levels of education than it does at higher levels. This result might indicate that low status identity boundaries are stronger between liberal and conservative Protestants than they are between the more and the less religious (Wuthnow, 1988). Where the relationship between heavy metal music and religion is concerned, the results are likely to be influenced by a popular form of Christian hard rock that complicates the popular depiction of heavy metal as amoral.

### 3.5. *Summary of findings*

In sum, ten of the eighteen types of music presented to respondents (bluegrass, country, rap, gospel, new age, oldies, reggae, blues, jazz and Latin music) distinguish between groups at low levels of education better than they do at other levels while four (swing, folk, show tunes and heavy metal) distinguish better at medium and high levels of education. Two more genres indicated both patterns. Age groups are distinguished better at medium and high levels of education by both easy listen-

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<sup>4</sup> I've evaluated age at one-half standard deviation above and one-half standard deviation below the mean: 38 and 54.




Fig. 4. Predicted probabilities of disliking a genre for miscellaneous differences where interactions terms were significant ( $p < 0.10$  in logistic regression models. *Note:* Full logistic regression results are reported in Appendix A. Probabilities were calculated for the mean value of each variable in the model except the three involved in the predictions (i.e. gender, education, and gender  $\times$  education). The probability of disliking a genre is equal to  $1/1+e^{-(\alpha+\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2 \dots + \beta_iX_i)}$ .

ing and pop, but easy listening provides a better boundary at low education for race and ethnicity as pop does for region. Only two genres failed to produce any significant interactions.

This tally indicates support for the greater formation of taste boundaries around group identities at low levels of education. The hypothesis is supported for race, ethnicity, religious conservatism and geographic region where group differences are strongest for less-educated respondents. The hypothesis is not supported for groups defined by age or gender, only two of the seven significant age interactions and none of the significant gender interactions were significant. That is, age and gender have important overall effects on musical taste, neither is marked by significant *additional* taste differences among less educated respondents.<sup>5</sup>

An overview of significant results indicates that sixteen of the eighteen types of music produced at least one significant interaction between a group identity and low education. The importance of this pattern lies not only in the finding that most genres may be used to delineate group boundaries but also in that *the only two types of music that did not produce significant interactions were the two high culture genres – classical and opera*. It seems logical to assume that high culture would not be good material for the construction of a boundary between two groups with low levels of education. The lack of significant interactions between low education and other possible group identities for the dislike of opera and classical music, then, lends support to the validity of my models.

<sup>5</sup> It may be, however, that gender differences are more apparent at finer levels of distinction. For instance Weinstein (1991) points to important gender distinctions *within* heavy metal music.



To the extent that increased cultural exclusiveness at a certain social location can be considered an indication of group identity maintenance, identities are constructed at lower levels of education more than they are at medium and high levels. It is important to note, however, that group-based musical dislike occurs frequently across educational levels. Dislike of 16 genres is significantly effected by age. Fifteen differ by race or ethnicity. Six differ by regional identity, and thirteen differ by education alone. (See Appendix A.) Thus, while there is evidence that some types of music are used to construct group identities more at lower levels of education than at higher levels, the use of musical taste in group identity construction is not restricted to less educated groups.

#### 4. Conclusion

This analysis provides strong evidence for Peterson and Simkus' (1992; Peterson, 1992) assertion that lower status cultures are more likely than high status cultures to be defined around race, ethnicity, religious conservatism and geographic region. Musical dislikes are significantly more likely to be patterned around these identities at lower levels of education than they are otherwise. Furthermore, classical music and opera are the only genres not used in within-status boundary construction.

The lack of evidence for low status boundaries along the lines of taste and age should not be considered evidence *against* such cultural boundaries. The use of music to construct group identities is sensitive to the structure of the music industry and its relationship to consumers (Peterson, 1990; Lopes, 1992). Respondents were not asked about their attitudes toward genres that have not found their way onto the radio. Thus, the lack of evidence for the use of musical dislikes by less educated gender and age groups cannot be considered evidence that these groups do not have cultural group boundaries. Rather, it is more likely that the music industry has not produced popular genres that highlight important group differences, that those types of music are not widely accessible, or that they were simply not included on the questionnaire.

This paper uses an inductive approach to group boundaries and taste publics. It is no longer valid to assume that class (or race or gender) is the most important group identity. We must, instead, determine the categories that people enact in their everyday lives to highlight differences between social groups or identities. Musical taste, however, is only small piece of that puzzle. Future analyses should explore other symbolic markers consumable and otherwise, as well as other bases of group identity such as family structure, political and civic activities, and sexual identity.

Even in the area of musical taste, there is much more work to do. More finely tuned models could be developed to test hypotheses about specific social identities and musical genres. In this analysis, I applied a standard set of group identities to all available musical tastes for an overall test of whether low status people evidence group-based differences in musical taste more than other respondents. There is no particular reason, however, to expect any significant effect of gender on "oldies" music – at any level of education.

Given ample evidence for the univore phenomenon, it might also be useful to examine univores in particular – people who dislike all types of music except one (or a set of closely related genres.). Are certain genres more likely to be at the center of univorous cultures? Are univores less tolerant in other respects? Exactly what proportion of univores have low levels of education?

Most importantly, we need to understand the social significance of this phenomenon. How did this pattern form and what difference does it make? I have suggested that differentiated cultural patterns can discourage collective action. Are musical univores less likely to join formal organizations? With richer data, we might be able to determine what effect univorous culture has on world view and social action.

### Appendix A: Coefficients for logistic regression of each genre on demographic variables and education interactions

Table A1

Ind. variable	Bluegrass	Blues/R&B	Classical	Country	Easy Listening
Education	.41 (.030)	-.101*** (.033)	-.321*** (.036)	.111*** (.034)	.035 (.033)
No HS Diploma	-.039 (.578)	-.473 (.570)	-.131 (.495)	-.626 (.771)	-.741 (.611)
Female	.137 (.150)	-.105 (.161)	-.352* (.148)	.073 (.165)	-.120 (.166)
Age	-.014*** (.005)	-.001 (.002)	-.01*** (.005)	-.011* (.005)	-.023*** (.006)
Black	.439 <sup>a</sup> (.231)	.698* (.323)	-.170 (.243)	.735** (.257)	.026 (.278)
Hispanic/Latin	.301 (.532)	.444 (.579)	-1.727 <sup>a</sup> (1.047)	-.116 (.643)	-1.353 (1.036)
Other Race	.443 (.387)	.187 (.462)	-.200 (.483)	-.483 (.547)	.594 (.407)
Fundamentalist	.023 (.168)	.351* (.174)	.413* (.161)	-.455* (.203)	-.092 (.192)
No Religion	.289 (.236)	-.412 (.317)	.140 (.258)	.394 (.241)	.463 <sup>a</sup> (.249)
Southern	.254 (.157)	-.045 (.174)	.261 <sup>a</sup> (.157)	-.332 <sup>a</sup> (.188)	.576*** (.174)
Female × No HS Diploma	-.104 (.351)	-.161 (.326)	.351 (.301)	.101 (.475)	.118 (.357)
Age × No HS Diploma	.006 (.009)	.015 <sup>a</sup> (.009)	-.008 (.008)	.002 (.012)	.021* (.010)
Black × No HS Diploma	1.139 (.423)	-.256 (.552)	-.562 (.429)	2.051*** (.547)	.480 (.470)
Hispanic/Latin × No HS Diploma	.467 5.898	.053 (.901)	.322 (1.323)	1.935 <sup>a</sup> (1.016)	2.272 <sup>a</sup> (1.267)
Other Race × No HS Diploma	.871 (.100)	.299 (1.036)	-1.137 (1.047)	2.708* (1.381)	.179 (.998)
Fundamentalist × No HS Diploma	-.375 (.386)	-.223 (.355)	-.363 (.330)	.193 (.522)	.222 (.397)
No Religion × No HS Diploma	-.489 (.649)	-.914 (.847)	-.475 (.568)	-.002 (.767)	-.141 (.638)
Southern × No HS Diploma	.050 (.370)	.224 (.353)	.413 (.323)	-.465 (.517)	.048 (.380)
Constant	-1.655** (.512)	-.206 (.551)	3.785*** (.558)	-2.739*** (.577)	-1.464** (.562)
$\chi^2$	47.782***	63.782***	213.479***	88.209***	51.280***
-2 log-likelihood	1472.767	1371.378	1529.955	1175.730	1267.269
Degrees of freedom	1512	1511	1511	1512	1509

<sup>a</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A2

Ind. variable	Folk	Gospel	Heavy Metal	Jazz	New Age/Space
Education	-.109*** (.032)	0.16 (.034)	.049 <sup>a</sup> (.029)	-.160*** (.033)	-.062* (.024)
No HS Diploma	-.814 (.520)	1.015 (.658)	.213 (.509)	-1.055 <sup>a</sup> (.573)	-.530 (.469)
Female	.047 (.149)	-.293 <sup>a</sup> (.163)	.496*** (.139)	.096 (.152)	-.185 (.119)
Age	-.040*** (.005)	-.035*** (.006)	.039*** (.005)	.006 (.005)	.013*** (.004)
Black	.838*** (.219)	-1.950** (.600)	-.019 (.239)	-.686* (.285)	.006 (.203)
Hispanic/Latin	.057 (.543)	.384 (.521)	.353 (.555)	-1.359 (1.039)	-.080 (.476)
Other Race	-.296 (.468)	-.134 (.463)	.639 (.470)	-.067 (.466)	-.320 (.363)
Fundamentalist	-.054 (.168)	-.911*** (.226)	.283 <sup>a</sup> (.164)	.602*** (.162)	.115 (.133)
No Religion	.095 (.241)	.936*** (.216)	-1.079*** (.210)	.058 (.277)	-.531* (.209)
Southern	-.079 (.163)	-.013 (.188)	.106 (.155)	.194 (.158)	.351** (.128)
Female	.252 (.317)	.481 (.443)	-.466 (.311)	-.046 (.315)	.287 (.279)
Age	.016 <sup>a</sup> (.009)	.015 (.012)	-.012 (.009)	.021* (.009)	.002 (.007)
Black	.313 (.401)	-.173 (1.211)	.045 (.435)	-.702 (.500)	.075 (.390)
Hispanic/Latin	-.308 (.903)	-1.026 (1.002)	1.663 (1.208)	1.049 (1.294)	-.130 (.801)
Other Race	-.603 (1.223)	-3.734 (8.214)	-.052 (1.230)	.246 (1.151)	-1.183 (.999)
Fundamentalist	-.088 (.348)	.349 (.540)	.240 (.351)	-.166 (.343)	.542 <sup>a</sup> (.311)
No Religion	-.443 (.607)	-.968 (.724)	1.625** (.582)	-.221 (.727)	.490 (.528)
Southern	.169 (.339)	-1.045 <sup>a</sup> (.541)	.025 (.338)	.376 (.334)	.496 <sup>a</sup> (.301)
Constant	-1.762*** (.565)	-.034 (.531)	-1.568** (.487)	.228 (.413)	.286 (.525)
$\chi^2$	130.611***	188.658***	162.721***	162.970***	68.887***
-2 log-likelihood	1507.644	1157.045	1610.411	1488.294	2047.874
Degrees of freedom	1511	1510	1512	1508	1508

<sup>a</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A3

Ind. variable	Oldies	Opera	Pop/Contemp	Rap	Reggae
Education	-.071 <sup>a</sup> (.037)	-.148*** (.026)	-.040 (.032)	-.009 (.027)	-.123*** (.027)
No HS Diploma	.058 (.787)	-.892 <sup>a</sup> (.485)	.796 (.647)	.041 (.495)	-.172 (.492)
Female	-.244 (.192)	-.317** (.122)	-.224 (.161)	-.291* (.130)	-.191 (.130)
Age	.059*** (.006)	-.026*** (.004)	.066*** (.005)	.030*** (.004)	.011** (.004)
Black	.147 (.334)	-.596** (.209)	-.235 (.294)	-1.182*** (.211)	-.527* (.236)
Hispanic/Latin	1.291 <sup>a</sup> (.667)	-.817 (.500)	.101 (.781)	-.342 (.472)	.566 (.490)
Other Race	1.080* (.493)	-.694 <sup>a</sup> (.378)	.697 (.449)	-.804* (.356)	.223 (.381)
Fundamentalist	.324 (.206)	.246 <sup>a</sup> (.137)	.554** (.174)	.400** (.149)	.594*** (.142)
No Religion	.341 (.352)	.048 (.206)	.261 (.295)	-.102 (.208)	.093 (.226)
Southern	.313 (.196)	.114 (.131)	.104 (.168)	.139 (.141)	.030 (.139)
Female	.200	.252	.320	-.147	.097
× No HS Diploma	(.359)	(.291)	(.324)	(.311)	(.288)
Age	-.004	.009	-.017 <sup>a</sup>	-.003	-.002
× No HS Diploma	(.011)	(.008)	(.009)	(.008)	(.008)
Black	-.248	.569	-.524	-.113	-.252
× No HS Diploma	(.516)	(.408)	(.476)	(.406)	(.423)
Hispanic/Latin	-.941	.334	.562	-1.829 <sup>a</sup>	-1.178
× No HS Diploma	(1.122)	(.828)	(1.067)	(.943)	(.883)
Other Race	-.958	-.854	-.496	-.580	-.993
× No HS Diploma	(1.151)	(.957)	(1.148)	(.968)	(.989)
Fundamentalist	.025	.173	.144	-.035	-.206
× No HS Diploma	(.388)	(.318)	(.356)	(.346)	(.315)
No Religion	.088	-.215	.445	-.319	-.374
× No HS Diploma	(.709)	(.538)	(.631)	(.558)	(.566)
Southern	.668 <sup>a</sup>	.502	.789*	.073	.593 <sup>a</sup>
× No HS Diploma	(.376)	(.312)	(.345)	(.333)	(.307)
Constant	-4.107*** (.658)	3.493*** (.440)	-4.127*** (.563)	-.324 (.448)	.287 (.452)
$\chi^2$	225.727***	43.151***	369.640***	158.435***	102.869***
-2 log-likelihood	1067.222	1971.123	1360.339***	158.868***	102.148***
Degrees of freedom	1512	1509	1510	15111	1511

<sup>a</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table A4

Ind. variable	Salsa/Latin	Show Tunes	Swing/Big Band
Education	-.090*** (.027)	-.199*** (.034)	-.143*** (.035)
No HS Diploma	-.199 (.473)	-.473 (.506)	-2.171*** (.573)
Female	-.232 <sup>a</sup> (.127)	-1.039*** (.159)	-.225 (.167)
Age	-.012** (.004)	-.027*** (.005)	-.047*** (.006)
Black	-.515* (.227)	.096 (.252)	.085 (.259)
Hispanic/Latin	-5.505 (5.037)	-.172 (.666)	-1.503 (1.048)
Other Race	-.323 (.399)	.224 (.473)	1.140** (.389)
Fundamentalist	.401** (.140)	.453** (.175)	.310 <sup>a</sup> (.183)
No Religion	.053 (.218)	.593* (.246)	-.077 (.286)
Southern	.188 (.136)	.464** (.166)	.304 <sup>a</sup> (.177)
Female	-.142 (.285)	.548 <sup>a</sup> (.304)	.841* (.332)
× No HS Diploma	.006 (.007)	.015 <sup>a</sup> (.008)	.038*** (.010)
Black	.328 (.402)	-.568 (.434)	-.063 (.440)
× No HS Diploma	4.115 (5.104)	-.222 (.963)	1.650 (1.297)
Hispanic/Latin	.282 (1.022)	-.043 (1.051)	-.268 (1.046)
× No HS Diploma	.074 (.310)	-.153 (.336)	-.063 (.359)
Fundamentalist	-.515 (.550)	-1.101 <sup>a</sup> (.575)	-.064 (.648)
× No HS Diploma	.537 <sup>a</sup> (.301)	-.099 (.326)	.582 <sup>a</sup> (.350)
Southern	-.515 (.445)	-1.101 <sup>a</sup> (.549)	-.064 (.581)
× No HS Diploma	-.515 (.445)	-1.101 <sup>a</sup> (.549)	-.064 (.581)
Constant	-1.018* (.445)	2.495*** (.549)	2.076*** (.581)
$\chi^2$	110.681***	201.904***	154.600***
-2 log-likelihood	1865.283	1419.984	1292.705
Degrees of freedom	1510	1508	1511

<sup>a</sup>  $p < .10$  \*  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

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