1. Explain whether Descartes and Aquinas accept the principle of efficient causality. Discuss what are the strengths of their view of causality versus the view of Hume on causality.

2. What is Hick's way of reading this causal series?

3. How does Hick evaluate the argument?

4. Would Aquinas agree with Hick as Hick has interpreted the premises? Explain whether or not you yourself would agree so far.

5. Aquinas distinguishes between an accidentally ordered series of causes and an essentially ordered series of causes. Explain that distinction by analyzing examples of the two series.

6. Which series does Aquinas use as the basis of his proof?

7. If God is the cause of all actions in an essentially ordered series, how can human action avoid being forced and necessitated by God's causality?

8. What are the premises and conclusion of Aquinas' argmnent?

9. What is the logical structure of the argument? ls the structure valid or invalid? Explain

10. Explain whether or not the first premise is true?

11. Explain whether or not the second premise is true?

13. What serious objection to the second premise is noted by James Ross? What is one way of responding? What is another way of responding offered by Ross?

15. What is the beginning point of the second way, and what is the beginning point of the third way? Then state the 3rd way of proving the existence of God in clear logical form.

16. What is the logical structure of the argmnent? Is it valid or invalid? Why?

17. Is the first premise true? Explain. (Evidence for the first premise is offered with paragraphs begiming: "The question now is…" and "In summary…"

18 Is the second premise true? That is, what argument does the teacher offer for the second premise?

19. How would Aquinas respond to the objection that he has shown that there exists a First Cause and a Necessary Being but not that God is the First Cause and Necessary Being? Give some indication of the analysis offered to respond to tbat objection.

20. Some basic principles of critical thinking are to develop:

Please explain fully how your thinking about God (whether you are a theistic, a pantheist, an agnostic, or an atheist) also exemplies each of the four key principles of critical thinking noted above. Number your answers 1 to 4, continuing your answers fully on the next page:

1. What is your basic argument about the existence of God State it in clear form either as a deductively valid argument or as a strongly probable argument.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2. What evidence can you offer or logical analysis of your premises to show that the premises of your argument are in fact true?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. How is your concept of the world, god, and humanity coherent and consistent, that is, without logical contradiction?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4. How is your view of God in agreement with well accepted truths in the sciences and humanities?

 Thomas Aquinas' Second Way of Proving the Existence of God

Aquinas, like Descartes, accepts the principle of efficient causality as self-evident The principle is expressed in

the text by Aquinas as "There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the

efficient cause of itself, for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible." In othor words, a thing which begins

to be must have a cause of its beginning to be. It is impossible for a non-existent thing to make itself existent. It is

impossible for non-being to cause being. Being cannot come from nothingness. That is, it is self-evident that being

cannot come to be from nonbeing.

Aquinae states his second way of proving the existence of God in the text, p. 135. This second way concludes to

God as the First Efficient Cause of a series of causes. There are two ways of interpreting this argument.

The first way of interpreting the argument is exemplified by John Hick in his Philosophy of Religion, p. 20. Hick

writes:

Every thing that happens has a cause, and this cause in turn has a cause, and so on in a series which must

either be infinite or have its starting point in the first cause. Aquinas excludes the possibility of an infinite

series or regress of causes, and so he concludes that there must be a first cause, which we call God.

Hick is presenting the argument as though it went like thisBaby Joe Jones had a cause, namely, his parents.

Baby Joe Jones had a cause of his coming to be, namely, his parents.

His parents had their cause, namely, their grandparents.

The grandparents had their causes, namely, the great grandparents.

And so the argument would go, until we would reach the first cause of the whole series.

Now Hick argues that Aquinas does not exclude with good argument that this regress into the parents,

grandparents, and great grandparents cannot be an infinite regress. Hick claims that Aquinas does not show that

the world of matter and energy could not be eternal. If matter and energy are themselves eternally taking new

forms, then there would be no need to say that the regress into past causes must stop with a first cause. Hick says

that it is possible that God is the first cause of the world but that Aquinas' argument does not prove that point.

As Hick has interpreted the argument of Aquinas, his analysis is correct: Aquinas does not prove that there must

be a first cause for the series of causes of baby, parents, grandparents, great grandparents.

However, Hick has mis-interpreted the argument. In other writings Aquinas explicitly considers the kind of series

of causes Hick assumes and agrees with Hick's analysis that we cannot prove that such a series must have a First

Efficient Cause. These are the references which Hick has ignored: Summa Theologica, I, 46, 2, ad 7m; Summa

Contra Gentiles, I, ch . 12, second paragraph from end. In these texts, Aquinas distinguishes between an

accidentally ordered series of causes and an essentially ordered series of causes.

An accidentally ordered series of causes is one in which the causation does not reach down to the ultimate effect

with it being essential that the original or earlier causes still continue to operate. For example, if I light a match

and then light a candle with the match and then light a second candle with the first lit candle and then light a third

candle with the second candle, the fire of the match does not have to continue to exist; nor does it have to continue

to cause the first candle to be lit in order for the first candle to continue to burn. The match can go out, and the first

candle can go out even though the second and third candle stay lit. In an accidentally ordered series of causes such

as the candles, the earlier candles can burn out even though more candles continue to be lit in the series. So the

earlier or even the first in the series cannot be proven to be still in existence. In such a series, there is no need to

conclude to a first efficient cause.

The insight into the baby Joe Jones--parent-grandparent series of causes is similar. The grandparents do not have

to be still alive for the parents to make the baby Joe Jones. It is possible that there can be a First Efficient Cause

still existing, but we cannot prove that there ids a first nor that it continues to exist. By faith, Aquinas believed that

God created the world at the beginning of time because of the opening line of the book of Genesis: "In the

beginning (of time) God created heaven and earth. Yet, Aquinas does not affirm that he can prove by natural

reason that God created the world at the beginning of time. He cannot prove that God is the First Efficient Cause

of an accidentally ordered series of causes.

However, Aquinas does affirm that he can prove the existence of God as the First efficient Cause of an essentially

ordered series of causes. In an essentially ordered series of causes, the causality of the first in the series extended

all the way through the intermediary causes to the last effect. Such a series differs from an accidentally ordered

series of causes in which the causality of the first, for example, the match, is not required to be existing and still

operating in order for the third candle to be lit. An example of an essentially ordered series of causes would be

this:

My mind and will direct my arm to move a piece of chalk.

My arm moves a piece of chalk against the blackboard.

The chalk leaves the effect of an English sentence on the blackboard.

In this series, my mind and will, my arm, and the chalk, the first in the series, namely my mind and will, is required

to be in existence and to be operating in order for the other causes in the series to be operating. If I were to have a

stroke, the chalk would cease writing an English sentence on the board and would fall to the ground or scratch a

scribble across the board. The sentence would not be completed if the first cause ceased to operate. In an

essentially ordered series, every cause in the series is essential here and now for the series to continue to operate.

If the mind-will-arm-chalk series of causes is an essentially ordered series of causes, then we have to conclude,

affirms Aquinas, that this series has a First Efficient Cause, which people call God. Thus this series would really be

God, my mind and will, my arm, and the chalk That God is the ultimate cause of this series does not mean for

Aquinas that the human being is not free. For God causes my mind and will in such a way that I am a rational and

free being capable of deliberation in my thought and free choice in my will. God causes things to happen in accord

with the nature of each thing. Irrational animals and natural forces have no intelligence and freedom. They bring

about their effects through causal necessity. But human nature is capable of rational and free action, and God

causes human beings to act in accord with people's own rational deliberation and free choice.

To conclude to a First Efficient Cause of such a series, it is required that Aquinas eliminate an infinite regress. The

infinite or endless regression into causes in the past was all right in an accidentally ordered series of causes but

not in an essentially ordered series of causes for two reasons:

First, all the causes of the series are in act, in simultaneous act, here and now actually producing the effect,

either bringing it into being or keeping it in being . Secondly, such a cause is essentially ordered to the cause

above it, because it is here and now receiving from the cause above it the power by which it operates as

cause. Now if we were to proceed infinitely in causes that receive their causality from another, we would

always be dealing with causes that are intermediate causes that are moved to their causality. Hence to say

there is no first cause is to affirm and deny being at the same time. For on the on hand we affirm that all

these intermediate causes have received an influence from another, and on the other hand we say they have

not received it, since we deny there is a first from which they have received it. Since, de facto (as a matter of

fact), the ultimate effect does exist, then de jure (as a matter of right), there must exist a first cause which

does not receive influence from another but is the cause of the influence received in those intermediary

causes. Hence it is necessary to posit a first uncaused cause. (Klubertanz & Holloway, Being and God, p.

246)

To say that the First Cause is First means that its act of causing is not received from another being; its causality is

uncaused. Since the first cause of an essentially ordered series must be uncaused, my mind and my will cannot be

the first cause it its series. For my mind and will can be affected by outside causes. But the First Efficient Cause as

first must be uncaused, must have no potentiality for being caused.

In summary: the logical structure of Aquinas' second way of proving the existence of God is valid

(1) If there exists an essentially ordered series of efficient causes and if an infinite regression in such causes

is impossible (intellectually absurd), then such a series has a First Efficient Cause whose act of causality is

uncaused.

(2) There does exist an essentially ordered series of causes, and an infinite regression in such causes is

impossible.

(3) Therefore, such a series has a First Efficient Cause whose act of causality is uncaused.

If premises 1 and 2 are true, then the conclusion must be true since it has the logical form:

If A is true, then B is true.

A is true.

Therefore B follows with necessity.

We have considered evidence for the key second premise, offering examples of an accidentally ordered series of

causes and of an essentially ordered series of causes. Also, we offered reasons why an infinite regression in an

accidentally ordered series is possible but not in an essentially ordered series.

A serious objection to Aquinas' view that infinite regression in an essentially ordered series is impossible is noted

by James Ross:

St Thomas did not know that there can be an infinite series which has both a first and a last member. I have

in mind the set of all real numbers between 1 and 2, or the number of points between and including an

arbitrarily selected A and B on a line segment. Both series have first and last numbers, and yet an infinity of

elements. (Philosophy of Religion, p. 35)

Ono way of responding to this objection would be to say that the infinite number of points between two points on a

line is not an essentially ordered series. The points on the line are accidentally related to other points on the line.

The first point can exist without any necessary or essential connection with third or fourth point on the line. Also,

we can compare the points on a line with the moments in time in the accidentally ordered series of baby Joe Jones,

parents, grandparents, and great grandparents. In the time-line of parents and other ancestors, Aquinas says that

an infinite regression is of moments at which the causes are at work is possible. However, in an essentially ordered

series of efficient causes, such an infinite regression would be impossible.

Another way of responding to the objection is offered by Ross. Ross says that it doesn't matter whether the series

of causes is finite or infinite in an essentially ordered series of causes. For an infinite series can have a first

member and a last member. For example, the series of real numbers between 1 and 2 has a beginning, the number

1, and an end, the number 2. So also, God would be the first member of the series of essentially ordered causes in

writing the sentence on the board, and the sentence on the board would be the last member. There has to be a first

cause whose causality is uncaused in order to explain the causes which have received their causality. Ross argues

that the causal activity in the later elements of the series of essentially order causes is dependent on the

simultaneous activity of everything that precedes it. If the activity of the combined members is nit accounted for by

the fact that they include one member which is uncaused by another causes, then the activity of the combined

preceding members is not accounted for at all or is accounted for by some cause not in the series. In the latter

case, there is an uncaused first cause which is not a member of the series. In the former cases, there is no

explanation for the existence and activity of the causes in the series, and in fact the causes in the series are

impossible [unintelligible] pp. 35-36

Ross is agreeing with the insight of the argument of Aquinas. Whether the series of essentially ordered causes be

a finite series or an infinite series, there must be a first uncaused cause of the simultaneous causality in that

series. If there be no such uncaused cause, then all the causes in that series are receiving their causality; but no

first cause is giving such causality. Such a situation is intellectually contradictory. Hence, there must be a first

efficient cause whose causality is uncaused.

After analyzing the classical arguments for the existence of God, of which Aquinas' second way is one example,

Ross writes:

Conclusion: Too many philosophers, writing introductory texts, treat the arguments for the existence of God as if

they have little to offer the student. They adopt a patronizing, rational agnosticism, apparently equally critical of all

the arguments for the existence of God and all those against, an attitude which loads the student to expect little

from the whole process of argumentation. (p.56)

Ross believes that there is a great deal to be said in defense of the arguments, just as he has defended Aquinas'

second way. He notes that more objections can be raised against the proofs for the new student in philosophy by

one who is more skilled in philosophy. The new student, however, should not be dismayed. For any given argument

in philosophy, whether in morality, or human freedom, or in questions about God, it is true that there are many

questions to be asked of the premises in those arguments. For example, in dealing with morality, we could

challenge the assumption of Aristotle and Mill that all our actions are directed toward happiness. We could

challenge the assumption that ethical principles should be based on the desire for happiness. In dealing with

determinism and freedom, we could challenge the assumption of behaviorism that human behavior can be

understood as though it were animal behavior. We could challenge the assumption of Rogers that self-awareness is

a trustworthy source of insight into our personal freedom. And finally in dealing with Thomas Aquinas' Second

Way, we could challenge his assumption that there is a difference between an accidentally ordered series of causes

and an essentially ordered series of causes. We could challenge his assumption of the fact that there does exist an

essentially ordered series of causes. We did challenge his assumption about an infinite regression being impossible

and noted how Aquinas could still respond to that challenge. There are so many more challenges and objections

and questions which we could have raised.

The point for the new student is not to be dismayed. Underlying the act of our doing philosophy is a trust in our own

humanity. There is a trust in our human experience and a trust in our human capabilities. We examine various

approaches we select the best approach so far as we know up to this point, but the important point is to be open to

further exploration and dialogue with others. We need not be dismayed that people argue differently about moral

principles, about determinism and freedom, and about God. For we realize that we do not start with objective

evidence and with absolute principles of knowledge. The various methods philosophers use affect the evidences

they find and guide them in interpreting those evidences. We need to work towards clarification of our own values

and beliefs, towards understanding of the values and beliefs of others, and towards the values implicit in the

clarification and dialogue that philosophy involves.

Thomas Aquinas' Third Way of Proving the Existence of God

The third way of proving the existence of God has been called the argument from the contingency of being and also

the cosmological argument. This argument differs from the second way in that the second way argues from the fact

of the existence of an essentially ordered series of causes to God as the First Cause of that series whereas the

third way argues from the fact of the existence of contingent beings to God the Necessary Being who is the cause

of contingent beings to God the Necessary Being who is the cause of their being. Both arguments begin with a

sensible fact as interpreted by the mind and conclude to God as the cause of that fact. In the second way, we begin

with the fact of an essentially ordered series of causes and conclude to God as the First Cause of Causality: in the

third way, we begin with the fact of contingent beings and conclude to God, the Necessary Being, who is the cause

of contingent beings.

The third way can be stated in the following valid form:

Premise 1: If contingent beings exist and if contingent beings cannot be the sufficient reason or cause of

their continuing to be, then only a Necessary Being can be the sufficient explanation of their continuing to

be.

Premise 2: Contingent beings do exist, and they cannot be the sufficient reason or cause of their continuing

to be.

Conclusion: Therefore, only a Necessary Being can be the sufficient explanation of their continuing to be.

The argument has the valid form:

If P, then Q.

P is true.

Therefore, Q is true.

If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true in this valid form. It has the same va;id form as thr

argument from the second way. If, whenever p happens, q happens, and if p did happen, then q has to have

happened.

The question is whether the premises are true. It is obvious that contingent beings do exist. Contingent beings are

beings which come to be and which cease to be. There are obvious examples such as cats, dogs, human beings, and

even species.

In this argument, Aquinas is not arguing that God is the cause of the beginning to be of such beings,, The Third

way is not the second way. In the second way, Aquinas argued that there could be an infinite regress in an

accidentally ordered series of causes of the beginning to be of causality. He also argued that there could not be

such a regress in an essentially ordered series of causes of the beginning to be of essentially ordered causality and

of the continuing to be of such causality. If at any time God ceased to exercise his act of causality in my mind and

will-arm-hand-chalk series of writing an English sentence on the board, then the causality of that series would

cease to be?

In attempting to establish the second part of premise 2, Aquinas employs a distinction between the essence of a

being and the existence of the being. The essence of the being is known in the definition of the being; the definition

identifies what the being is. For example, a human being is a rational animal (a being whose purpose or goal is to

be rational and free, wise and loving).

As Sartre pointed out, the essence of a being can be defined even though the being does not exist. For we can

know the purpose of a being and the means to that purpose before the being is made to exist. The existence of a

being is known in what Aquinas calls the judgment of existence. For example, we either affirm or deny that a

human being exists. In sumary, essence is known in a definition that takes the following form of our example: a

human being is a rational animal. And existence is known in a judgment of existence that takes the following form

for our example: a human being exists. Essence refers to what a being is, whereas existence refers to that a being

is.

Aquinas argues that contingent beings, beings which come to be and which pass away, are beings in which there is

a real distinction between their essence and their existence. This is the argument of Aquinas:

Premise 1: If it were of the essence of a contingent being to exist, then a contingent being would not be able

not to exist. ("If a thing accounts for its own continuing to exist by virtue of what sort of thing it is, then it

would not be possible it not-to-be, since in order for it not to be it would have to cease to be of the sort that it

is (it would have to cease to be what it essentially is). In other words, if Socrates were of such a sort

(essence), e.g., a human being, that he existed because of what he was, then in order not to exist he would

have to become non-human and this is impossible because Socrates, whether existing or not, it is essentially

a human." Ross, p. 63)

Premise 2: A contingent being is able not to exist. (For example, Socrates has ceased to exist.)

Conclusion: Therefore, it is not of the essence of a contingent being to exist. In other words, contingent

beings cannot be the sufficient reason or explanation of their continuing to be. Even while contingent beings

continue to exist, their existence is a continuing effect being received from a cause of existence. For the

essence of contingent beings is not a sufficient reason for the continuing existence of such beings.

The question now is: Could another contingent being be the continuing cause of another contingent beings

continuing to exist? The answer of Aquinas is that an infinite series of contingent beings cannot be the sufficient

reason or cause of the continuing to exist of Socrates. For those contingent beings would receiving their act of

causing being. That would be a contradiction that all the causes would be receiving their causality but no first cause

would be giving causality. An infinite regress of essentially ordered causes of the continuing to exist of contingent

beings is intellectually absurd. There must be a Necessary Being whose Essence it is To Exist. Only such a

necessarily existent being could be the sufficient reason for the continuing existence of contingent beings.

In summary:

If contingent being Y were the cause of the continuing to exist of contingent being Z, then Y would also need

to be explained. For any contingent being would not of its essence exist. Any contingent being's continuing to

exist is an effect and requires an explanation.

An infinite series of contingent beings than could not explain the continuing to exist of such beings.

Hence there must be a Necessary Being whose Essence is identical with Existence, whose Essence it is To

Exist; in other words, there must be a being whose essence requires that it necessarily exist.

An Objection

Sometimes the objection is made that Aquinas has shown that there exists a First Cause and Necessary

Being, but not that God is the First Cause and Necessary Being.

The Answer

Aquinas is only naming the First Cause and Necessary Being to be God at this stage of his argument. His

students knew that he would later show in his lectures by further argument that the First Cause and

Necessary Being are in fact the Almighty Good Being that humans worship.

One 19th Century writer, Cardinal Newman, outlines how one may show that the First Cause and Necessary Being

are God:

Since God is First Cause (and Necessary Being)….he differs from all his creatures in possessing existence a

se, (that is by himself). From this "a se-ity" (that is, from his uncaused possession of his own necessary

existence) on God's part, theology deduces by mere logic most of his other perfections. For instance, he

must be both necessary and absolute, cannot not be, and cannot in any way be determined by anything else.

This makes him absolutely unlimited from without, and unlimited also from within; for limitation is no-being;

and God is being itself (the being whose essence is to exist necessarily and as uncaused by any being). This

unlimitedness makes God infinitely perfect. Moreover, God is One and Only, for the infinitely perfect can

admit no peer. (Newman, The Idea of a University)

In summary, Newman's argument is valid:

If limitation is a way of restricting being, then the Necessary Being unlimited .

Limitation is a way of restricting being.

Therefore, the Necessary Being is unlimited.

If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. Newman argues that the premises are true. The first

premise is true conditionally. For as the being whose essence it is to exist necessarily and without causality from

any other being, the Necessary Being cannot be limited by any other being, cannot be affected by any other being.

And the second premise is true. For limitation is a way of restricting being. For example, blindness is a limitation in

that it is a restriction of vision; blindness involves loss of sight. In summary, God as the necessary being cannot

have limitation upon his being for he is the Being whose Essence is Necessary Existence.

Newman goes on to argue:

If the Necessary Being is unlimited, then it is infinitely Perfect.

The Necessary Being is unlimited.

Therefore, the Necessary Being is infinitely perfect.

This argument has the same valid form. If its premises are true, its conclusion must be true. The first premise is

true for Newman because if the necessary being is unlimited being, then it must be infinite (limited) perfection or

goodness. For evil is a loss of being or a restriction of being; for example, blindness is evil as a loss of sight. But

God as the Necessary Being cannot lose Being; God as the uncaused Cause cannot be caused by another being to

lost his causality and the second premise is true as the conclusion of the preceding valid argument.

Finally, Newman can argue validly:

If God is infinite being, then God is One and Only.

God is infinite being.

Therefore, God is One and Only.

If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. The second premise is taken from the conclusions of the

preceding arguments. The first premise is true for Newman. For if there could be two infinite beings, two infinitely

perfect beings, then the infinite power of each one would be a limit on the other, which is impossible for the infinite

being cannot be limited. Hence God is One and Unique.

So, Newman, drawing upon the approach of Aquinas shows us the answer of Aquinas to the objection that Aquinas

only assumes that the first cause and necessary being is God.

In the next lecture on Hume, we will continue the philosophy of religion section by an analysis of Hume's theory of

knowledge and his rejection of proofs for God's existence. We shall see that he will challenge the heart of the

arguments of Descartes and Aquinas. For Hume will question their concept of efficient causality. Hume will argue

that we have no such rational insight into causality and that we cannot use the idea of causality as the basis of

proof for God.

LINKS

William O'Meara (c) Copyright, 1997